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The Regulatory Framework of Executive
Remuneration: Contributions from Shareholder
Activism and Board Accountability
Professor Jingchen Zhao and Dr. Zhihui Li

INTRODUCTION
The economist Roger Bootle once argued that “the level of executive
pay is a total and complete scandal. There is a real crisis of capitalism
about all this. Where people are paying themselves tens of millions of
pounds, it adds up to a form of expropriation.”1 The High Pay
Commission in the UK emphasized that excessively high pay is “a
symptom of a wider market failure based on a misunderstanding of how
markets work at their best.”2
According to the Commission’s
investigation, in 2011, even though economic growth was slow,
executive remuneration in FTSE 100 companies3 had risen by 49%
on average, compared with a 2.7% average increase in employees’
payments.4 It was suggested that the growing income gap between
top executives and average employees might pose a threat to the
companies’ long-term interests.5
To have a better understanding
of the executive compensation problem, it is essential to undertake an
in-depth analysis of the rationale for the awarding of
 Professor of Law, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University,
Jingchen.Zhao@ntu.ac.uk
 Juris Doctor candidate, Emory University Law School, zhihui.li@emory.edu
1. Julia Finch, Jill Treanor & Richard Wachman, Critics Unite over Executive Pay to Force the
‘Aliens’ of Business down to Earth, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/busi
ness/2010/mar/31/myners-urges-fsa-to-investigate-shareholders-role [perma.cc/YTR9-6JGL].
2. The High Pay Commission, Cheques with Balance: Why Tackling High Pay is in the National
Interest, HIGH PAY CENTRE (2012), http://highpaycentre.org/files/Cheques_with_Balances.pdf [perma.
cc/HZ8B-CD5J].
3. FTSE UK Index Series, FTSE RUSSEL, https://www.ftse.com/products/indices/uk
[perma.cc/8PTE-TL98] (defining FTSE 100 is the first 100 public companies listed in the LSE, and
FTSE 250 is the companies listed from the 101st to 350th in the LSE).
4. FTSE Statistics, LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/stat
istics/ftse/ftse.htm perma.cc/Y7UM-239L].
5. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,
98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 261–62 (1990).
[203]
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compensation. In the UK, the Corporate Governance Code (the “Code”)
defines the board’s role as “to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the
company within a framework of prudent and effective controls which
enables risk to be assessed and managed.”6 Directors owe fiduciary duties
to their companies, as well as a duty of care.7 The duty to avoid conflicts
in the scope of fiduciary duties8 in particular requires a personal obligation
to practice good conscience and loyalty to the company. Because a
“deficient” remuneration structure can encourage risk-taking and thereby
cause damage to the company,9 directors should not be the parties who
decide on the amount of their own remuneration. They should neither
permit someone who is dependent on the directors to decide on their
remuneration, nor receive an “excessive and unreasonable” amount of
money.10 Furthermore, it is often suggested that the shareholders, as the
“owners” of the company, must be given the power to protect their
interests, and they should have a right to express their views on executive
remuneration or on the risks imposed by the company’s remuneration
practices.11
From a contract perspective, when directors are employed by the
company they are bound by the company’s the certificate of incorporation.
Problems may then appear if the company seeks to amend the terms of a
director’s remuneration without complying with the articles.12 According
to the Code, this problem can be resolved by introducing a claw-back
provision to prevent rewards for failure.13 Despite the fact that topics
related to the rationale and reasons for executive remuneration have been
discussed, issues of how to regulate and the forms of regulation have been
rarely examined. The article aims to fill this gap.
The article will focus on the measures and trajectory of executive
remuneration regulation by addressing the following research question: if
regulation is appropriate and the way forward, what form should it take to
solve current executive remuneration problems? The article will offer a
6. Corporate Governance Code 2016, FRC, 2016/April, sec. A, ¶ 1 (Eng.).
7. See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, c.46, §§ 172, 174 (Eng.).
8. See Companies Act 2006, c.46, § 175 (Eng.).
9. Janice S. Miller, Robert M. Wilseman & Luis R. Gormez-Mejia, The Fit Between CEO
Compensation Design and Firm Risk, 45 ACAD. MGMT. J. 745, 754 (2002).
10. Joseph Lee, Regulatory regimes and norms for directors’ remuneration: EU, UK and Belgian
law compared, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 599, 603 (2012).
11. Id. at 609.
12. Id. at 612.
13. FRC, supra note 6, Schedule A (“Consideration should be given to the use of provisions that
permit the company to reclaim variable components in exceptional circumstances of misstatement or
misconduct”). Note, about Claw-back; see DAVID. L. SCOTT, WALL STREET WORDS: AN A TO Z GUIDE
TO INVESTMENT TERMS FOR TODAY’S INVESTORS, 63 (3d ed. 2003) (“A claw-back is required when
managers take a contractual share of early investment gains that are subsequently reduced by losses”).
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comprehensive analysis of three concerns, including pay for
underperforming executives, shareholders’ difficulties in understanding pay
reports, and the increasing pay gaps between executives and formal
employees, followed by a critical analysis of possible solutions.
Looking at the current attempts at legislative reform in this arena, the
aims of governments in reforming executive remuneration practice are to
promote long-term success for their public companies and economies,
using the method of providing shareholders with stronger powers to
securitize executives’ pay. To empower shareholders with more voice on
directors’ remunerations, a “say on pay” regime has become a global trend
as an attempt to solve executive remuneration problems. However, this
global trend is subject to a number of uncertainties, such as: Is shareholder
empowerment in terms of a say on pay able to assure long-term
productivity?14
If shareholder empowerment is not as useful as
governments think, are there any other methods within the domain of
corporate governance to ensure pay for performance? Will board
accountability to shareholders in relation to executive pay be sufficient to
improve pay design? We will address these questions in this article, in
order to provide a comprehensive answer to the issue of how to regulate
remuneration.
A functional and effective mechanism for setting executive
remuneration will be proposed in a normative way. If agency theory and
managerial theory can be used as theoretical bases to prove that pay for
performance is the final goal of setting executive managers’ remuneration,
an effective way to achieve this final goal should be proposed. The focus
of this article is on how to achieve this goal effectively and efficiently,
together with the challenges of designing a more appropriate and workable
remuneration system. The requirements for forming a good remuneration
system will be discussed from several perspectives, such as the vesting
period design of long-term incentive plans, the balance between motivation
and punishment, and non-financial incentives in executive pay.
We will consider the central relationships that emerge from practical
factors between executive pay and shareholder intervention, board
accountability and shareholder participation. Good pay practices will be
analyzed from the perspectives of the shareholders, the executive directors,
the board, and employees.
This article is an original attempt to establish a more effective
regulatory framework for executive remuneration problems through
shareholder empowerment, board accountability, and executive
14. Robert S. Kaplan & David P. Norton, The Balanced Scorecard – Measures That Drive
Performance, HARV. BUS. REV. Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 77.
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remuneration design. Current executive remuneration problems are
categorized into two perspectives: pay for underperformance and deficient
remuneration structures.
Building on existing research on current
regulatory methods to solve remuneration problems and improve the
system’s effectiveness, this article makes some original contributions to
establishing detailed proposals for better regulatory frameworks and
legislative instruments in a few respects. These include adjusting
shareholders’ voting rights and participation in voting for executive
remuneration policies, emphasizing the board’s remuneration reporting and
liabilities for directors’ failures in negotiating remuneration design, and
improving remuneration design by requiring longer holding periods of
executive’s incentive equities in the company.
The article is organized in three subsections. Section I will explore the
rationale for having a shareholder say on pay. It will suggest that having
shareholder power over remuneration policy making will not be harmful to
the company’s long-term productivity. Arguments will be made to support
the point that shareholders, as a whole, belong to a separate group in
corporate governance that tends to focus on the company’s long-term
success. The advantages and disadvantages of shareholder empowerment
will be discussed from the say on pay experiences of the UK and the U.S.
This section will demonstrate that shareholder intervention has a positive
influence over issues of executive remuneration. This section will also
provide several suggestions for shareholders about how to improve their
intervention.
Section II will provide a discussion about the need for board
accountability. Contrary to shareholder empowerment, director primacy
suggests that executive remuneration should not be subject to much, if any,
interference from shareholders. This section will provide evidence that
board accountability is not adequate to solve remuneration problems and to
promote a company’s long-term success without regulatory intervention.
Problems and good examples of ways to solve these issues will be
investigated, and several suggestions will be provided for how to improve
accountability. Several principles will be suggested for how to improve the
board’s service when making remuneration reports.
Section III will provide proposals for improving executive
remuneration pay plans. A summary of regulatory suggestions will provide
guidance for how to adjust the pay structure to align pay and performance
based on the spirit of company law and empirical evidence.
Additionally, fairness issues in pay will be investigated. There will be
a discussion around employees participating in executive pay design and
practice. The shareholders’ say on pay, as a comparatively practical
method to monitor executive pay, has not been recognized as the only way
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to solve compensation problems. The notion of having an employee say on
pay has been mentioned by many scholars, although a workable method is
difficult to be established. Some suggestions for how to achieve a broader
scope of say on pay will be provided in Section IV.

I. SHAREHOLDER SAY ON PAY
A. SHAREHOLDER POWER AND LONG-TERM SUCCESS
Shareholder empowerment is a notion that legislation can adopt in order to
provide investors with the power to monitor management issues in companies.
However, a consensus has not been reached on the efficiency and effectiveness of
shareholder intervention in companies. Evidence from the financial crisis 2008
showed that shareholders in the UK’s public companies were provided with a
greater scope of power under company law and corporate governance in
comparison with the U.S. However, stock prices fell faster in the UK than they did
in the U.S. during 2008, which led to a financial crisis in the UK as serious as that
in the U.S.15 In terms of the history of UK company law legislation, it would be
misleading to say that the basic features of modern companies, such as their
separate personality, centralized management, limited liability, and the free
transfer of shares, have evolved together to form today’s corporate model.16
Nonetheless, these basic features were generated by law at different times and
adjusted to later environments.17
The two most common approaches created by company law legislations to
enable shareholders to intervene in the management of companies include the exit
channel and the voting channel.18 In public companies, shareholders can express
their dissatisfaction and subsequently make an impact on managerial decisions by
threatening to sell their shares, which may lead to a drop in the share price. This
threat to sell may not only influence the value of stocks held by the executive
directors from their compensation, but also has negative effects on the reputation
of the company19 and ultimately on the reputations of the executives. The other
way is for shareholders to express their opinions by voting against certain board

15. Brian Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” during the 2008-9 Stock Market
Meltdown?, 124 ECGI L. Working Paper 6 (2009).
16. Simon Deakin, Corporate Governance and Financial Crisis in the Long Run, 417 U. OF
CAMBRIDGE WORKING PAPER CTR. FOR BUS. RES. 6 (2010)
17. Id.
18. Konstantinos Stathopoulos & Geoigios Voulgaris, The Impact of Shareholder Activism: The
case of say-on-pay, 24 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L. REV. 359, 360 (2015).
19. Alex Edmans, Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia, 64 THE J.
OF FIN. 2481, 2493 (2009); see also Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The Wall Street Walk and
Shareholder Activism: Exit as a form of voice, 22 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 2445, 2476–77 (2009).
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decisions or directors at shareholders’ meetings.20 The shareholders’ say on pay is
one factor in the second channel.
In addition to agency theory, the high liquidity of capital markets also has a
huge impact on the trajectory of corporate law and governance development.21
The 2008 financial crisis generated huge concerns that the increasing liquidity of
capital markets changed the ownership pattern of public companies—from family
members to institutional shareholders through widely diversified pension funds
and mutual funds.22 Furthermore, there is a trend towards shares to be held for
relatively short periods, including those owned by institutional shareholders such
as hedge funds, insurance policies, and securitized instruments.23 With the rapid
increase of equity liquidation, the use of shareholder power can become
complicated.
Since these shareholders make the presumption that their
investments will only stay for a short time in one company, it is doubtful whether
they will focus on the companies’ long-term interests when they vote on corporate
policies, being more likely to sell their shares and terminate their interest in the
company.
Say on pay reforms, which enhanced shareholders’ powers to improve board
accountability in the 1970s and the early 1990s, may have already conferred too
much power on the shareholders.24 It has been suggested that these reforms may
be erroneous in regulating shareholders’ power. For example, institutional
shareholders, who were more likely to make informed decisions, tended to see
their equity capital contribution decline during the financial crisis. Moreover,
providing them with more power for intervention in management may cause other
problems25 such as short-term rent-seeking behaviors and sudden extractions.
Nonetheless, it may be too arbitrary to deny the necessity for regulations giving
shareholders powers to influence public companies. This can be explained by
exploring the methods by which shareholders can intervene in the management of
companies.
Despite the fact that shareholder empowerment has been questioned in terms
of whether it can be used to promote long-term productivity, it is accepted that
shareholder engagement can be helpful in preventing companies from pursuing
short-term success. Roger Barker, Director of Corporate Governance of the
Institute of Directors of Corporate Governance (IoD), when commenting on new

20. R. Ashraf, N. Jayaraman & H.E. Ryan. Jr., Do Pension-related Business Ties Influence
Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 47 J.
OF FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 567, 573 (2012).
21. See Deakin, supra note 16, at 8.
22. Id.
23. Leslie Hannah, The Divorce of Ownership from Control 1900: Re-calibrating Imagined
Global Historical Trends, 49 BUS. HIST. 404, 411 (2007).
24. Biagio Marino, Show Me the Money: The CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule and the Quest for
Effective Executive Compensation Reform, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1355, 1362 (2016).
25. Deakin, supra note 16, at 9.
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2014 EU proposals for shareholders’ rights26 said that the IoD would agree with
the commission’s overall objective of enhancing long-term, constructive
engagement of institutional investors with listed companies.27
Long-term success and long-term productivity are phrases that appear in
almost every reform document on executive compensation.28 The World
Economic Forum defines long term success as a company that is an attractive long
term investment for potential shareholders, who can invest with the expectation of
“holding an asset for an indefinite period of time.”29 It may also be the main
reason why governments choose to give shareholders the power of say on pay.
The UK’s binding say on pay was provided because of pressure from institutional
investors and the outrage of the public.30 Nevertheless, the long-term success of
public companies and the equity market still primarily relies on all the factors
which influence regulations, and also the same goals that governments and
shareholders are expecting.
The goal of long-term success is the reason why executive remuneration is
often equity-based. Tying executives’ pay packages to a company’s stock price
incentivize executives to work hard for the interest of the company and the
shareholders with the focus on the company’s long-term success.31 If executive
compensation is only a base salary, there is no incentive to remain at that
company; an executive could easily jump ship to a more lucrative company,
without losing any unvested equity in their current role.32 However, compared
with directors, shareholders are more long-term focused. A survey by Graham,
Harvey and Rajgopal suggested that 78% of executives would sacrifice the
company’s long-term success to meet short-term earnings targets to attract more
investment.33 Even for those shareholders who are more likely to have a short-

26. See Press Release, European Commission, European Commission proposes to strengthen
shareholder engagement and introduce a “say on pay” for Europe’s largest companies (Apr. 9 2014),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-396_en.htm?locale=en [perma.cc/4RT4-XU4B].
27. Trade Union Congress, Beyond Shareholder Value: The reasons and choices for corporate
governance reform, https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/BSV.pdf [perma.cc/PLF4-LAW5] at 17.
28. See, e.g., Dept. for Bus., Energy & Industrial Strategy, Directors’ pay: revised remuneration
reporting regulations (June 27, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/directors-pay-revi
sed-remuneration-reporting-regulations [perma.cc/J2YL-C9WM]; Dept. for Business, Innovation &
Skills, Executive pay: consultation on enhanced shareholder voting rights, (Mar. 14, 2012) https://
www.gov.uk/government/consultations/executive-pay-consultation-on-enhanced-shareholder-votingrights [perma.cc/GR2H-RH2B]; Luis A. Aguilar, The Ceo Pay Ratio Rule: A Workable Solution For
Both Issuers and Investors, SEC (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-onopen-meeting-on-pay-ratio-aguilar.html [perma.cc/H944-YGV6] at 8.
29. World Economic Forum, Global Agenda Councils, Long-term Investing (2012), http://
reports.weforum.org/global-agenda-council-2012/councils/long-term-investing/ [perma.cc/CZ9E-EVG8].
30. 163 Parl Deb HC (13th ser.) (2012) col. 4 (UK).
31. Michael Jenson & Kevin Murphy, CEO Incentives – It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How,
22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 64, 70 (2010).
32. Id.
33. John Graham, Campbell Harvey & Shiva Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of Corporate
Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 4 (2005).
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term outlook, such as hedge fund investors who hold shares for a period of one or
two years, their perspective focuses on the long-term profits of the company, since
they only buy shares when the price is relatively cheap.34
Shareholders who focus on the long-term interests of the company will help to
increase the corporate value. Edmans noted that shareholders with a considerable
holding of shares can influence a public company’s management through market
efficiency.35 Contrary to the traditional view of corporate governance, he argued
that shareholders can improve corporate value even by using the exit channel,
namely threatening to sell their shares.36 For shareholders, especially shareholders
with a relatively large holding of shares—the “blockholders” referred to by
Edmans—a large holding of shares increases their intervention and monitoring
incentives. A new way of thinking about shareholders was proposed by viewing
them as informed traders instead of controlling entities.37 These shareholders
would collect more information about the companies, not only internally but also
from the markets.38 This information will help them to establish more accurate and
informed opinions about the value of the company. If their voices are ignored at
meetings or their share value decreases, shareholders will trade in their shares.
Having several blockholders trade in their shares at the same time may be
dangerous and harmful for companies if the share price drops quickly and there is a
significant reputation loss.39 Pressure like this will force the board to listen to
shareholders and may help to enhance corporate value indirectly.
Moreover, this difference in short-term and long-term focus between directors
and shareholders leads to agency costs.40 To stop the directors, especially
executive directors, from using the information or power available to them due to
their position to satisfy their own interests, companies may incentivize directors
with remuneration packages involving equities, in order to align their interests with
those of the shareholders. On the other hand, shareholders need to use their voting
power on executive remuneration, which may involve out-of-pocket expenses if
they have to obtain expertise from professional institutions to understand
remuneration reports and make decisions.
Deakin provides two reasons why current reforms are empowering
shareholders in terms of corporate governance issues.41 First, because agency
theory has been justified by reforms in corporate governance since the 1990s, it is
now the shareholders’ right and their duty to ensure that executives are making the
right decisions on issues in relation to companies cash flow, while the
34. Id.
35. Edmans, supra note 19, at 2438.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Xuemin (Sterling) Yan & Zhe Zhang, Institutional Investors and Equity Returns: Are shortterm institutions better informed, 22 REV. OF FIN. STU. 893, 897 (2009).
39. Alex Edmans, Blockholders and Corporate Governance, 6 ANN. REV. OF FIN. ECON. 23, 30
(2014).
40. Id.
41. See Deakin, supra note 16, at 8.
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shareholders’ standard of capital returns is usually stricter than the board’s when
they are monitoring projects to make sure the firm reaps benefits and can provide
stable employment. Second, shareholders may have a “rent-seeking” purpose,
tending to use the liquidity of capital at their disposal to “extract” benefits from the
company’s business. Similar to directors’ rent-seeking behaviors, shareholder
rent-seeking, such as that undertaken by hedge fund managers, may destroy a
company’s long-term success and be detrimental to other constituencies.
Even if we disregard the first concerns around short-term shareholding
influences on investors in corporate policymaking, the second important question
is whether these shareholders are sincerely interested in interfering in executive
remuneration. In addition to the shareholders’ willingness and incentives to
interfere with executive remuneration, shareholder intervention in management
policies has not been optimistically regarded because of information asymmetry
problems. It has been suggested that shareholders are reluctant to intervene in
management issues, and while voting outcomes are ignored by boards and CEOs,
shareholders will put little effort into changing these policies.42
Therefore, in relation to problems surrounding shareholder empowerment, it is
uncertain whether the regulation is still valid in providing shareholders with the
right to interfere in remuneration policy, and it is questionable whether the use of
shareholder voting will be beneficial for the company’s long-term productivity.
These questions will be analyzed next.
Myners proposed in his report that although institutional shareholders had
claimed the predominant place in the UK, these investors were still reluctant to
intervene in their investee companies even when the companies were
underperforming.43 However, Myners later suggests that if shareholders were
given the power to intervene in decisions about managers’ pay, they would be
capable of making decisions on how to make the best of situations.44 Under
Myners’ logic, shareholders can be active in voting and making decisions for
companies if they are empowered with a proper design for their intervention.
Sheehan mentioned that “there is an iterative process in the regulation of executive
remuneration practice and thus the potential for evolution in executive
remuneration practice influenced by evolutions in the activities of disclosure,
engagement and voting”.45 Moreover, the following statement in the Impact of
Assessment of Improvement of Transparency of Executive Remuneration
emphasizes the importance of providing shareholders with more power on
remuneration:

42. Flip Chart Fairy Tales, Will Shareholder Empowerment Curb the Executive Pay?, (May 28,
2018, 12:33 AM), https://flipchartfairytales.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/will-shareholder-empowermentcurb-executive-pay/ [perma.cc/RD48-E4EN].
43. Paul Myners, Myners Review of Institutional Investment in the UK, The Government
Response, HM Treasury & The Department for Work & Pension, 2001, at 11.
44. Id.
45. Kym Sheehan, The Regulatory Framework for Executive Remuneration in Australia, 31
SYDNEY L. REV. 273, 278 (2009).
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shareholder empowerment lies at the heart of the UK’s
corporate governance framework and the proposed reforms are
consistent with that approach. Shareholders will be in a stronger
position to promote a clearer link between pay and performance,
ensuring that companies act in the best interests of their ultimate
owners and contributing to a better functioning corporate sector
more generally.46
In October 2014 the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (now
replaced by Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy) published a
report on the implementation of the Kay Review, with the purpose of building a
sustainable environment for long-term equity investment in the UK. From the
perspectives of encouraging effective engagement and stewardship, improving
narrative reporting, forming trust-based relationships between investors and
companies and fixing the misalignment of incentives that would undermine this
trust, this report aims at increasing shareholder involvement in company issues.47
In addition, the FRC offered their Stewardship Code to improve institutional
shareholders’ stewardship responsibilities and their monitoring activities.48 This is
a new era for corporate governance, especially from the perspective of shareholder
intervention. Investors, especially institutional shareholders, tend to focus more on
the companies’ long-term business. Institutional shareholders are also agents for
other entities.
Furthermore, the remuneration principles set out by these giant investors,
including the National Association of Pension Funds (“NAPF”), Hermes Equity
Ownership Services, the BT Pension Scheme, RPMI Railpen Investment, and USS
Investment Management, suggest that management should make a material longterm investment in the shareholders of the businesses they manage, and the best
way to align the interests of shareholders and executives is via the ownership of
shares over the long term, with “ownership obligations increasing with
seniority.”49 With efforts from both investors and government, the empowerment
of shareholders in voting will promote the healthier development of pay practice
and long-term success for companies in relation to executive remuneration. This is
supported by the following reasons.
The first reason why shareholders are provided with power over executive pay
is that one important purpose of setting remuneration is to align the interests of

46. Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Impact Assessment (IA), Improved
Transparency of Executive Remuneration Reporting, 2012, REF 12/889, at 7.
47. Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and LongTerm Decision Making: Implementation progress report, 2014, REF: BIS/14/1157, at 8.
48. FRC, UK Stewardship Code, September 2012.
49. NAPF et al., Remuneration Principles for Building and Reinforcing Long-term Business Success,
http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary/0351_remuneration_principles_for_building_
and_reinforcing%20_longterm_business_success_nov2013.aspx.
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principal and agent, while decreasing the risks of investors’ shareholdings. There
are reasons to be suspicious of shareholders’ influence on long-term productivity.
Institutional shareholdings pool money from investors and entrust this wealth to an
asset company, while the investing contracts are made by investors, mutual fund
managers, and the company. They normally have few incentives to rein in any
excessive risks that executive managers may take (for the purpose of increasing
directors’ pay);50 in voting on the resolutions of the company, they are “reluctant
activists.”51 These investors have no direct relationship with the investing
company and therefore will not initiate proposals as regularly as other investors.
On the other hand, the goal of fund managers is likely to be short-term, since the
performance valuation of the fund is based on annual comparison with peer
groups, and thus they seldom have incentives to interfere in corporate governance
issues, let alone the executive remuneration policy, of the investing company.52
Nonetheless, this indirect relation does not stop investors like this having more
power over voting, and intervening in executive pay policy and reports. Bebchuk
proposes that although mutual funds are not a good basis for investors and fund
managers to initiate management of the company, the other large institutional
shareholders will provide a trend in favor of voting on resolutions for these
investors to follow.53 From another perspective, shareholders are not that
dissatisfied about current executive remuneration designs, which contain bonuses,
equity options, pensions, and other benefits for managers.
Moreover, evidence from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), an
international shareholders’ voting agency which provides services to nearly 1,600
institutions globally and is “a leading provider of proxy advisory and corporate
governance solutions to financial market participants,”54 shows that shareholders
pay attention to remuneration policy making and reporting, and with certain
perspectives developing from this attention, they can promote the companies’
long-term profits.
In the ISS’s 2014 survey of pay for performance alignment opinions among
105 institutional shareholders from the UK, the U.S., continental Europe, Canada,
and the Asia-Pacific region, the findings revealed some of the shareholders’
opinions when they voted on executive pay reports.55 Their survey focused on
issues of company performance goal setting, executive pay level, investors’ say on
pay, and managers’ income comparison in the same industries.

50. John Coffee, Liquidity Verses Control: The Institutional Investors as Corporate Monitor, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1333 (1991).
51. Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. BUS. REV., 148 (JanFeb, 1994).
52. EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 78 (2005).
53. Lucian Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1796 (2006).
54. ISS, 2014-2015 Policy Survey Summary of Results, (Sept. 2014), http://www.issgover
nance.com/iss-releases-results-annual-global-voting-policy-survey/ [perma.cc/8R3H-Q44D].
55. Id. at 5, 10.
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According to this survey, 60% of the shareholders would still be concerned
about the company’s report on pay levels, even if the company’s performance was
better than other peer companies in the same industry. Nineteen percent would
prefer an absolute limit on the pay level. Fourteen percent would support
proportional limits on remuneration in relation to the company’s absolute
performance.56 As for the say on pay issue, 63% of the shareholder respondents
indicated that if there were positive changes in the implementation of pay policy in
the second and third years, they would be less concerned and more enthusiastic
about the policy they have voted for.57 With respect to European institution
respondents, 83% of the respondents expressed their interest in peer group pay
level comparison.58
The following table represents some of the results of the survey and shows the
attitudes of the shareholders and companies towards corporate goals and
remuneration design. Forty-three percent of the shareholders thought that if the
directors’ performance targets were lowered their compensation levels should
change in line with performance targets, and only 19% of shareholders were
willing to pass pay packages without performance linked to them in order to attract
talented executives.59
Q: Which of the following best reflects your institution’s
idea of the relationship between goal setting and award
values?
1. If performance goals are significantly reduced, target
award levels should be commensurately modified to
reflect the expected lower level of performance.
2. Performance goals should be set independently of
target awards, which must be maintained at competitive
levels in order to attract and retain top quality executives
3. The compensation committee should have broad
discretion to set both goals and target awards at levels
deemed to be appropriate under the circumstances
4. Other

Shareholder

Board

43%

3%

19%

25%

26%

67%

12%

5%

Source: ISS, 2014-2015 Policy Survey Summary of Results
The ISS report did not give their conclusion and comments on this survey, but
from these statistics, a large proportion of institutional shareholders from various
countries indicated their concerns with the level of pay, the alignment between pay
and performance, the implementation of pay policy, and also comparison in terms
of pay levels within peer groups. Although these concerns are presented on a

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 5, 10.
Id. at 5, 10.
Id. at 5, 11.
Id. at 9.
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general scale, some guidelines drawn up by large institutional shareholders to
promote best practice in terms of executive compensation will be analyzed later.
With the influence from this large proportion of shareholders who are sympathetic
to promoting pay for performance, Bebchuk’s previous assumption that the voting
ideas of several active institutional shareholders can influence other shareholders
and change their ideas in voting may be proved correct, even if other short-term
shareholding investors may hold different voting opinions on remuneration reports
before annual meetings.60 Thus, emphasizing investor power in pay policy making
and reporting may be a trustworthy method of improving compensation
governance.
The second reason for empowering shareholders in terms of executive pay is
that legislation may be an easier route to empower shareholders, since it is hard to
ensure board accountability on executive remuneration.
The details of
remuneration reports and policies which are presented for resolution must be
emphasized, which reflects the general requirements of various regulations on
compensation and transparency. Although there are concerns over whether
shareholders will be qualified by the law to make decisions in relation to corporate
governance, Bebchuk suggests that the legislative choice is always between giving
shareholders powers to influence the running of the company, or leaving the
boardroom to maintain its “indefinite” control, with executives having managerial
influence over the board.61 We are convinced that the former should be considered
as the preferred choice for legislation on executive remuneration, providing the
shareholder with powers to review and supervise the board on executive
remuneration policies. Empirical evidence to be explored in the following section
will illustrate that allowing shareholders to review and supervise the board in
remuneration policy making will help to reduce the undue influence of executives
over the board. Additionally, some problems related to shareholders’ say on pay in
practice will be summarized to allow for further discussion.
B. SHAREHOLDERS AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION: EXPERIENCES
AND THE UK IN APPLYING ADVISORY VOTES

OF THE

U.S.

Investors in UK listed companies perceive the say on pay as a valuable
monitoring mechanism, and have successfully used this power to stop executive
remuneration levels from growing rapidly while increasing the sensitivity of pay to
poor performance.62
With the international trend towards empowering
shareholders in terms of managers’ remuneration issues and the globalized flow of
capital, this shareholder voting influence on executive compensation shows general

61. Id.
62. Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the
UK, 17 REV. OF FIN. 527, 555 (2013).
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similarity across developed countries.63
In 2009, Conyon and Sadler published a report on how shareholders reacted to
the UK’s regulatory shareholders’ non-binding vote, investigating a large sample
from nearly 50,000 voting resolutions of quoted companies during the period from
2002 to 2007.64 According to their research, it is rare among shareholders to show
absolute dissent to executive remuneration reports, with only seven to 10%
demonstrating total dissent across five years.65 Shareholders in the UK were
satisfied with companies’ pay policies; over 90% voted in favor of the reports, and
moreover this approval increased over the period.66 Nonetheless, in comparison
with other proposals such as nomination and non-pay policies proposed by the
board, shareholders demonstrate a higher level of dissent in relation to
remuneration reports.67
Evidence showed a negative correlation between shareholders’ positive votes
and the level of executive remuneration, which proposed that boards reacted
quickly to shareholders’ concerns about provisions such as rewards for failure after
the enactment of the UK advisory shareholder say on pay in 2002.68 More
significantly, poor performance by executive managers was more strongly
correlated with steep penalties.69 However, boards responded to shareholders’
dissatisfaction by adjusting the total level of executive pay, but not the structure of
it,70 which still remains a potential issue since the level will influence one year’s
pay but the structure, especially an equity pay design, will affect pay over the
longer term.
Concerning shareholder advisory votes, Ferri and Maber investigated seventyfive public companies that experienced a more than 20% shareholder veto on
executive pay reports.71 The boards of these companies provided their revised pay
policies with changes mainly introduced in two areas: existing executive contract’s
notice periods, and executive pay’s performance-based conditions.72 After the
shareholders showed their dissatisfaction towards the pay plan, sixteen companies
reduced the executives’ notice period from twenty-four months to twelve months,
while managers’ golden goodbyes were reduced to nearly half of the original

63. Nuno Fernandes, Miguel Ferreira, Pedro Matos & Kevin Murphy, Are US CEOs Paid More?
New International Evidence, 26 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 323, 325 (2013).
64. Martin Conyon & Graham Sadler, Shareholder Voting and Director’s Remuneration Report
Legislation: Say On Pay in the UK, 18(4) CORP. GOV.: AN INT’L REV. 296, 297 (2010).
65. Id. at 301, 303.
66. Id. at 308–09.
67. Id. at 22.
68. Mary Carter & Valentina Zamora, Shareholder Remuneration Votes and CEO Compensation
Design, AAA 2008 MAS Meeting Paper, at 24 (Nov., 2007); see also Walid Alissa, Boards’ Response
to Shareholders’ Dissatisfaction: The Case of Shareholders’ Say on Pay in the UK, 24 EUR. ACCT.
REV. 727, 750 (2015).
69.
Ferri & Maber, supra note 62, at 534.
70.
Alissa, supra note 68, at 728.
71.
Ferri & Maber, supra note 62, at 536.
72. Id.
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amount.73 The findings of this research confirmed that boards tend to reduce levels
and other obvious factors in pay plans if there is strong dissatisfaction among
shareholders.
Although shareholders’ voting activities show an optimistic trajectory towards
company pay plans since the 2002, the 2008 financial crisis definitely caused
alarm for shareholders and governments, not only reminding them of the
nonfeasance of boards, but also hastening legislation to provide an efficient
solution.74
In the U.S., except for several provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act enforced in
2011, the impact of the remaining areas was uncertain. “Many companies are
hedging their bets and will respond in more detail once the SEC confirms the
rules,” said Gregg Passin, a partner in Mercer’s Executive Rewards team in the
US.75 Meanwhile, institutional shareholders continue to “exert a strong influence
on pay discussions but with around ninety-eight percent of US companies having
passed their say on pay resolutions in 2011 and 2012, it is fair to say that progress
is being made.”76 Moreover, Mark Hoble, a partner in Mercer’s Executive
Rewards team in the UK, commented that
companies are considering the appropriateness of their historic
pay decisions through the lenses of current public perception and
economic performance. We are seeing companies undertake
scenario modeling for their planned pay policies. This is an essential
and sensible part of corporate risk and reputation management.77
Although the advisory say on pay was not implemented until 2010 in the US,
shareholder proposals for transparency in executive pay, especially from
institutional shareholders, had already increased significantly. Research has shown
that from 2002 to 2007, shareholders in 134 companies voted negatively on the
boards’ executive pay proposals in their annual general meetings, leading to $7.3
million deduction in CEOs’ pay overall.78 Concerns about the structure and equity
design component of executive pay from institutional shareholders were also
revealed, even before the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act.79 One goal of US

73. Id.
74. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
(2012).
75. Viola Lloyd, Shareholder Spring Goes Global, THE HR DIRECTOR (Oct. 12, 2012),
http://www.thehrdirector.com/features/miscellaneous/shareholder-spring-goes-global/ [perma.cc/MRS
6-SGA9].
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Volkan Muslu, Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay, 24
REV. OF FIN. STUD. 535, 544–45 (2009).
79. Fabrizio Ferri & Tatina Sandino, The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Financial Reporting
and Compensation: The case of employee options expensing, 84 THE ACCT. REV. 433, 453 (2009).
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regulation is to promote more transparent executive compensation and better
alignment of CEO incentives with shareholders’ interests.80
Studies have shown say on pay played a positive role in achieving this goal.
According to Kronlund and Sandy, having a say on pay vote can make companies
change how they pay executives.81 However, despite the law’s intention to
improve executive pay practices, the say on pay mandate has not unambiguously
resulted in more reasonable CEO compensation.82 Contrary to the regulation’s
goal to reduce executive pay, the net result of these changes may raise total
executive compensation. The fact that companies change pay practices between
fiscal years, with or without shareholders voting again, is evidence that pay
practices are not optimal. If they were, whether a vote is held or not should be
irrelevant for pay.
In the U.S., shareholders of 2,173 public companies “overwhelmingly”
approved their companies’ compensation reports in 2013.83 Ninety-seven percent
of the U.S. public companies received shareholder votes affirming the CEOs’ pay,
while only 57 companies experienced a shareholder advisory veto on their pay
proposals.84 Evidence from the U.S. advisory vote has shown that when there is
increased shareholder scrutiny, the board does alter executive pay policies: salaries
are lower while grants of restricted stock are higher.85 Compensation practices that
are vetoed by activist investors, such as golden parachutes, are reduced or
eliminated.86 These changes are consistent with the trajectory of improving the
transparency of pay and complying with proxy advisory companies’ guidelines,
which may help companies to ensure that the say on pay vote passes. However,
despite these changes, the net effect is still a higher overall level of pay.87
Additionally, companies make greater use of less scrutinized forms of executive
pay, such as pensions and golden goodbyes, if there is increased shareholder
monitoring.88
Say on pay is not a complete panacea. For instance, there is a crucial
shortcoming in the say on pay legislation in the U.S. The Dodd-Frank Act requires
companies to have a shareholder vote on pay policies every second or third year.89
However, it also enables companies to “strategically shift pay” across years to
continue compensating executives in the same way that they used to while also

80. See Stathopoulos & Voulgaris, supra note 18.
81. Mathias Kronlund & Shastri Sandy, Does Shareholder Scrutiny Affect Executive
Compensation? (Dec. 3, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358696 [perma.cc/2NDZ-45QJ].
82. Id.
83. John Carney, Why Say on Pay Failed and Why That’s a Good Thing, CNBC (July 3, 2013,
6:03AM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/100860959 [https://perma.cc/2E4A-Y5B5].
84. Id.
85. See Kronlund & Sandy, supra note 81.
86. Id.
87. Gretchen Morgenson, Shareholder’s Votes Have Done Little to Curb Lavish Executive Pay,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2015.
88. See Kronlund & Sandy, supra note 81, at 19.
89. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173), § 951.
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gaining shareholder support, thereby potentially undermining the goals of the
regulation to decrease the level of executive pay.90
Therefore, it can be concluded that overall the advisory say on pay regulations
in the U.S. and the UK have brought several positive changes in executive
remuneration. These changes were not only reflected in the boards’ reaction to
shareholder dissatisfaction but also in the general level of it, although the structural
design of pay is still in great need of improvement and scrutiny.
From the shareholder’s perspective, although regulations have given a say on
pay to improve board accountability to shareholders, the board or the remuneration
committee can still find opportunities to undermine shareholder engagement.
Shareholders’ negative responses to a pay policy will be delivered before the
policy is taken to resolution, but these negative responses may not be turned into
revisions because of game-playing between shareholders and the remuneration
committee. The concern from the U.S. say on pay experience would be that more
engagement and increased transparency in pay may not necessarily lead to board
accountability and shareholder diligence to influence a change in the pay policy.91
Providing shareholders with voting power to decide on executive pay policy
has been accepted and implemented as a useful tool by governments as a warning
and monitoring mechanism. Empirical evidence has also shown that this voting
power has several effects in improving the practice of managers’ compensation
plans and reporting.
However, it is also worth mentioning three main
shortcomings, as follows: (1) shareholders tend to be dissatisfied when boards
change the level of executive remuneration, but they always ignore the structure of
pay plans, and sometimes it is difficult for shareholders to understand the pay
structure; (2) shareholders’ voting powers have not stopped pay for failure, and
golden goodbyes and golden hellos can be camouflaged in other ways by the
board; and (3) governments have too often focused on the voting power of the
shareholders, neglecting to examine how to increase the engagement of
shareholders in the pay setting progress, and how to enhance conversations
between shareholders and boards. The following suggestions will deal with these
problems.
C. MEASURES TO IMPROVE SHAREHOLDER INTERVENTION
It is comparatively easier to regulate listed companies by requiring their
boards to act to serve the interests of shareholders, with few regulations requiring
or encouraging shareholders to do anything. However, from the perspective of
executive remuneration, shareholders may need further instructions and guidelines
from regulation. From the discussion above, shareholders would like to have
strong involvement in remuneration reports at AGMs, because remuneration

90.
91.

See Kronlund & Sandy, supra note 81 at 19.
KYM SHEEHAN, THE REGULATION OF
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SAY ON PAY 76 (2012).
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reports detail how the payouts of the companies are set, which or part of which
could have contributed to shareholders’ dividends.
To encourage shareholders to participate in remuneration decisions with
companies to a greater extent, and to improve boards’ accountability, current
legislation and corporate codes from various governments have paid significant
attention to regulating pay transparency and the disclosure of details in pay
policies. In terms of pay policy disclosure and shareholder understanding of
problems, it may be wiser to prioritize the quality of pay transparency over its
quantity. Shareholders will be responsible for understanding pay structures and
single elements of each pay plan, in order to facilitate better communications with
companies.
From the discussions above, it is time for the development of stewardship
codes, which regulate shareholders in terms of how they approach their roles in
corporate governance. Except for some remuneration guidelines drawn up by
institutional shareholder groups mentioned above, organizations such as the FRC
in the UK and the ICGN (International Corporate Governance Network) based in
the U.S. have provided stewardship codes to give guidance to institutional
shareholders so that they can participate more effectively in corporate issues.92
Feedback and improvement of these codes is ongoing and will be discussed in the
following section.
i. Participation and Understanding
It is difficult for most individual investors to understand remuneration reports.
Even board members and other managers may find it difficult to understand their
pay packages, which may contain equity plans, long- and short-term targets,
earnings per share or total shareholder returns.93 Shareholders, especially small
group investors, are encouraged to play a more active role in scrutinizing
remuneration reports and communicating with directors. Institutional shareholders
with in-house experts who can analyze remuneration reports and provide advice,
such as the GC100 group, the ABI and NAPF, always renew their guidelines for
executive pay reporting. These guidelines provide details on te formation and
content of remuneration reports to explain every element of directors’ pay
packages. Individual investors should be encouraged to read these guidelines if
they have difficulty understanding remuneration reports.
There are various forms and data in the remuneration reports, and shareholders
should use their discretion and business judgment to determine whether the pay
policy or the implementation report is fair and reasonable. With the help of the
ISS and other consultancies, institutional shareholders can easily reach a general
92. FRC, supra note 48; see also International Corporate Governance Network, Global
Stewardship Principles (May 28, 2018), http://icgn.flpbks.com/icgn-global-stewardship-principles/#p=1
[perma.cc/Y5BR-YZWH] [hereinafter ICGN].
93. Michael Skapinker, Executive Pay: The battle to align risks and rewards, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
30, 2015.
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understanding of executive pay plans and reports.
From the voting perspective, stewardship codes have provided a good
foundation to encourage institutional investors to share their voting policies and
results, letting the other shareholders have a general understanding of how better
informed shareholders consider the pay plan and vote on it. The ICGN’s Global
Stewardship Code suggests that institutional investors should disclose and develop
their actual voting policies and records, seeking to explain to companies the
reasons underlying why they voted against any pay policies before the
shareholders’ meeting.94 The stewardship code contains an innovative but maybe
not very practical idea, proposing that investors should be open to joining and
collaborating with other investors from both domestic and overseas arenas to
leverage the voice of minority shareholders and exert influence over corporate
decisions.95
Despite its positive impact to improve relationships and
communication among various shareholders, this idea involves a few reservations
that need further consideration. Timing could be a thorny issue, since not all
shareholders may be able or willing to have discussions about decisions before a
resolution at a company’s AGM. Moreover, the cost of gathering the shareholders
may be considerable, with additional agency costs, especially in jurisdictions with
dispersed ownership such as the U.S. and the UK.
Institutional shareholders, e.g., pension fund managers, banks, insurance
companies and so on, are companies built upon the interests of their beneficiaries.
The UK Stewardship Code suggests that institutional investors should report
periodically on their stewardship and voting activities to their clients or
beneficiaries in terms of how they have discharged their responsibilities.96 In a
ICGN meeting, Stout proposed pressure from beneficiaries could make
institutional investors concerned about their investments.
Under certain
circumstances, they may hold shares for a rather short period and sell them in a
liquid market, though institutional investors are supposed to be long-term
focused.97 Although institutional investors have great influence over corporate
governance public companies, concern about their clients’ benefits and paybacks
will decrease their impact as valuable investors providing good guidance for small
shareholders. However, rather than falling within the scope of the stewardship
code, this question relates to corporate governance codes and company law
legislations in general. It is for the boards of investee companies to provide
methods to retain their institutional shareholders in the long term, such as
increasing their voting power or paybacks according to their length of investment

94. ICGN, supra note 92, at 18 (Principle 5, Exercising voting rights in an informed and
responsible manner).
95. Id. at 16 (Principle 4, Engaging companies and collaborating with other investors).
96. FRC, supra note 48 at Stewardship Code, Principle 7.
97. Interview by Peter Montagnon with Stephen Haddrill, Rahki Kumar, Lynn Stout, and
Motoyuki Yufu, Share Ownership in A Global Context Is Stewardship Working?, ICGN (May 28,
2018), https://www.icgn.org/share-ownership-global-context-stewardship-working-0 [perma.cc/AZ3LNQ8D].
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in the company.
These methods, which are called time-weighted voting or time-weighted
dividends, have been proved to be effective in attracting long term investors and
lead investors to focus on the long-term interests of the company. A recent study
suggested time-weighted voting, which provides a shareholder with more votes per
share if they hold shares for at least three years, can empower long-term investors
and may improve corporate value.98 The empirical evidence shows that compared
with dual-class shareholding which lets investors hold two different classes of
shares to vote, time-weighted voting is a better choice for companies and
shareholders to prevent “myopic” or short-term focused behavior among
managers.99
As mentioned above, if companies can provide efficient methods to retain
shareholders’ investments or help them to focus on a long-term view, shareholders
may be able to influence companies positively from their perspective and use their
two intervention channels to help companies to create remuneration policies and
reports reflecting long-term value.
ii. Principles
Taking the UK Stewardship Code as an example, it is not enough to require
that institutional shareholders should disclose their voting policy and records or be
willing to act collectively with other investors.100 With the improvement of
transparency in various reports at AGMs, especially in remuneration reports,
shareholders need more time to analyze and understand the reports. Absorbing
opinions from each other is important. Thus, principle 5 of this code could be
revised to: Institutional investors should be willing to meet with other investors
before resolution and act collectively with other investors where appropriate.
In order to promote the long-term success of the company, the UK Corporate
Governance Code provides that it is the board’s role to provide effective controls
and methods to ensure this objective.101 However, there is no follow-up section
that provides detailed measures for how this should be done. Section E the Code
merely requires that the board should establish a satisfactory dialogue with
shareholders.102 A stronger addition should propose a new method to retain
shareholders’ investment for long-term periods.
Improving the shareholder monitoring function during the creation of
executive remuneration policies and reports does not necessarily mean that
shareholder value is the only goal that should be considered while setting

98.

Lynne Dallas & Jordan Barry, Long-term Shareholders and Time-phased Voting, 40 DEL. J.
541, 552–53 (2015).
Id. at 546–47.
FRC, supra note 48 at Stewardship Code, Principles 5–6.
FRC, supra note 6 at Corporate Governance Code 2016, S A.1.
Id. at section E.1.

OF CORP. L.,

99.
100.
101.
102.
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managers’ pay. Boards may also take other issues into consideration when
planning and implementing pay policies.

II. REMUNERATION PRACTICE AND BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY
Historically, shareholders have long been seen as passive, or even irrelevant to
the running of companies in the development of modern corporate theories.103
Shareholder value was even neglected during the middle decades of the twentieth
century, since what shareholders did to exercise their ownership was vote at AGMs
which were mostly formalities, while the board had the power to delegate
management to executives who were professionals but had no stock in the
company.104 Another argument around shareholder empowerment suggests
increasing shareholder involvement will shift the balance between the board’s
authority and its accountability.105 Despite the fact that it may be easier for the
shareholders to set guidelines for an effective remuneration policy, under most
circumstances they would still not be efficiently or adequately informed about
what is happening in the boardroom.
Following the 1995 Greenbury Report’s proposal that executive pay should
comprise more long-term incentives to promote the notion of “pay for
performance,” the percentage of equity incentives in pay packages, such as
restricted equity options and long-term incentive plans, has increased. The average
of the FTSE 100 CEOs’ equity option value was 240% of their salary level in
2015, compared to 210% in 2014.106 However, emphasizing long-term incentives
and more equity options in pay packages cannot effectively bring about an optimal
scenario by following agency theory, i.e., pay for performance. Normally, equity
options are set to align the interests of shareholders and executives and to retain
and motivate directors for competitive performance. Remuneration practices
cannot achieve this alignment because the board power and equity option’s design
in executive pay may sometimes be harmful to the company’s long-term
success.107 Executive directors will use their managerial power to influence the
board and its members; for example by using the power of promotion and
awarding independent directors who are executives in another company with nonexecutive posts, and/or hiring these executives as members of their remuneration
committee. Under this managerial influence, boards and remuneration committees

103. Deakin, supra note 16, at 3.
104. Deakin, supra note 16, at 3–4.
105. See generally Jay Lorsch, Empowering the Board, HARV. BUS. REV., (Jan-Feb. 1995).
106. PwC, Raising the Bar: The state of executive pay in 2015 (May 28, 2018), http://www.
pwc.co.uk/services/human-resource-services/insights/raising-the-bar-the-state-of-executive-pay-in2015.html [perma.cc/9NNR-XLTD].
107. Janice McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulation Executive Compensation to
Realign Management and Shareholders’ Interest and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 994 (2004).
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may show some rent-seeking behaviors in using the explicit influence of capital
markets and products on executives’ equity holdings and bonuses, in order to
increase the final rewards of executive directors. Mechanisms to stop this from
happening are now considered.
A. DIRECTOR PRIMACY?
The Director Primacy approach proposes that centralized authority and good
use of accountability mechanisms, eliminates the need for shareholders to approve
certain detailed resolutions, since generally they are not able to make informed
decisions. Interestingly, other arguments, either from supporters of Director
Primacy who suggest that the board is reliable in making decisions, or from
proponents of having employees on the board in order to make executive pay
fairer, are not overly enthusiastic about the idea of using shareholder voting rights
to solve executive remuneration problems. Early in the 1990s Villiers pointed out
that because of information asymmetry, shareholders face various obstacles if they
wish to interfere in corporate management,108 such as a lack of information
concerning comparative groups’ income from remuneration consultants, or
confusion about the criteria that remuneration committees write into pay reports
relating pay to performance. For example, there may be various long-term
incentive plans with different conditions in a single executive’s pay package, a
confusing set of conditions for shareholders to comprehend fully. Bainbridge
posits that empowering shareholders in the corporate decision-making process
might disrupt the vesting of authoritative control from the board in their
companies.109
Moreover, Sharfman argued that instead of enhancing decision making,
empowering shareholders will increase errors and lead to “a shift of agency costs
from management to shareholders that overcomes whatever benefit is received
from a reduction in management agency costs.”110 Even worse, the more
successful shareholder activities are, the more damaging those activities are likely
to be to the economy.111
From the Director Primacy point of view, some proponents suggest that the
rapidly growing executive remuneration is not a problem. According to
Bainbridge’s understanding of the capital market, investors will not purchase
stocks from companies which provide executives with excessive remuneration, and
creditors will not lend money to companies which lack executive director
accountability.112 Therefore, the cost of issuing stocks will rise for these
companies while their income falls. As a result, these companies will become
108.
109.
110.
(2012).
111.
112.

Charlotte Villiers, Executive Pay: Beyond Control, 15 LEGAL STUD. 260, 261 (1995).
Stephen Bainbridge, Is ‘Say on Pay’ Justified, 32 REG. CORP. GOV. 42, 46 (2009).
Bernard Sharfman, What’s Wrong with Shareholder Empowerment, 37 J. CORP. L. 903, 907
Id. at 908.
Bainbridge, supra note 109, at 45.
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more vulnerable to hostile takeovers and management reconstruction,113 which will
bring more instability to both companies and shareholders.
The problems of executive remuneration rest on the key point that effective
corporate governance requires the decision-making authority to be vested in a
small, discrete central agency, rather than in a large diffuse electorate.114
Bainbridge is not convinced that the idea of board accountability can be
sustained.115 He even proposes that, if shareholders realize the cost of getting hold
of adequate information and the seriousness of unreasonable interference, they will
keep their distance and refrain from making every decision themselves, leaving
most issues to the board.116 Thus, we are wondering to what extent we need to
emphasize the notion of board accountability to promote the efficiency and
effectiveness of executive remuneration issues.
Details of the board’s function should be studied before director primacy is
admitted. As discussed before, there are three main functions of boards. The first
is a monitoring role, which requires them to select, compensate, and make
decisions about the retention of chief managers while overseeing the process of
accounting, financial reporting and auditing, to help shareholders with these
disclosures in order for them to make assessments of the company.117 The second
function is a protective/restorative role, indicating that the board should assist the
company in claiming and protecting its resources. The third function is to
formulate strategy under the direction of senior managers, in order to serve the
shareholders in their interests with more information about their responsibilities
while remaining accountable to these responsibilities.118 Executive remuneration
design is within the first, monitoring function. Nonetheless, the third function,
related to the board’s accountability to shareholders, should be also emphasized
when considering remuneration issues.
The board can develop its monitoring work in three ways: employing structure
(different committees, such as remuneration or nomination committees, in one
boardroom), composition (having expertise on different committees and
independent directors to ensure unbiased decisions), and practice (concerning how
to manage the firm to establish the board’s role).119 Research has proven that
regulation has relatively little to do with the evolution of the board’s structure and
practice. It is the market and social forces that improve these elements.120 Thus, a
113. Id.
114. Id. at 47.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 801–02 (2001).
118. Id. at 802–03.
119. Lynne Dallas, Development in US Boards of Directors and the Multiple Roles of Corporate
Boards, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV., 20 (2003).
120. Melvin Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1267 (1999);
see also Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Norms and the Self-governing
Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1623 (2001).
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more appropriate way for legislation to improve board accountability and the
monitoring function of the board is from the composition aspect, by inviting more
independent directors to join the functional committees.
According to
Langevoort’s analysis, it is the law which should continue to insist, or should insist
more rigorously, on increasing the independence of boards to solve conflicts
between the agent and the shareholders. However, Langevoort also claimed that if
the law becomes too aggressive it will ruin the social dynamic of the board and
result in a less effective working group.121 Having more independent directors on
executive committees will not have much influence on executive pay design; this is
explained as follows.
Delegation of various powers to the committees of boards does not function
well. Mitchell concluded that the boards’ problems have existed from the very
beginning, since the time boards were created to solve agency problems.122 The
board was designed to fulfill a monitoring function with periodic intervention by
experts as a means of allowing outsiders, i.e., independent directors, to monitor
aspects such as nomination, compensation, and auditing. However, the board has
developed primarily to shield executive managers from liabilities,123 since there is
only a direct norm from legislation to indicate what is right and what is possible in
practical activities.124 As lawyers are usually the ones who interpret law to the
companies, the directors’ understanding of legislative norms is second- or even
third-hand,125 not to mention the fact that lawyers may sometimes deliver
information after being influenced by executives.
However, the companies that failed during the 2007-09 financial crisis, despite
being criticized for having inadequate governance, did have independent boards,
separate positions of chair and CEO, and enough defense against hostile
takeovers.126 If legislation remains deficient in regulating the board practices,
shareholder empowerment may constitute an appropriate remedy in a corporate
governance context. Although scholars such as Bainbridge and Sharfman favor
directors running corporations and minimizing shareholder intervention, Director
Primacy may not be the most appropriate approach when dealing with executive
remuneration issues. Bebchuk and Fried explained how executives and board
members could benefit each other through remuneration practice.127 Without
intervention or regulation, the independence of boards and remuneration
committees cannot be trusted while they are making remuneration policies and
reports.

121. Langevoort, supra note 117, at 8.
122. L. E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards, GWU LEGAL Studies Research Paper No. 159, 6–7
(2005).
123.
Id.
124.
Langevoort, supra note 117, at 11.
125.
Id.
Cheffins, supra note 15, at 6.
126.
127.
LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSIE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
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From the arguments above, two main findings can be concluded: (1) Director
Primacy is not an ideal method to handle executive remuneration issues.
Employing more independent directors to improve board accountability is not
adequate to promote a more effective excursive remuneration mechanism; and (2)
there should be other ways to improve the board accountability within its
monitoring and strategic functions. Shareholder empowerment through the say on
pay has an indirect influence on pay practice, but it is the remuneration committee
and the board who have the most direct impact on pay. Hence, how should the
board and the board members be guided to improve their accountability?
B. PRACTICE IN ORDER TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY?
Guidelines, principles and various codes of conduct have been created for
directors and remuneration committees to ensure their function in remuneration
design and implementation. However, as Cullen argued, the traditional and
nondescript language characteristics of these codes and guidelines rely to a large
extent on executives and other directors working towards the overarching goal of
shareholder value by using terms such as “structure,” “performance objectives,”
and “disclosures.”128 However, these are general requirements, without providing
explicit requirements.
In fact, the GC100 and Investor Group guidance, published in 2013 and
amended in 2014,129 shows that guidelines from institutional shareholders are
sometimes not as general as this. They are enriched by detailed requirements,
regulating the aims of remuneration committees in designing executive pay, the
design of various financial incentives criteria and reporting structures, and even
how the committee will communicate with shareholders if shareholders have
concerns about the pay policy. Nevertheless, guidelines cannot guarantee full
compliance, not to mention following the best practice of remuneration design.
However, the GC100 principles made a good start in improving guidelines from
shareholders and suggesting ways to promote the accountability of remuneration
committees.
Remuneration committees do not need to have expert knowledge about how to
design pay. Instead, they need to negotiate with remuneration consultants and
make decisions by using informed judgment. As Keay noted, with shareholders
having more power to influence remuneration policy, the board, especially the
remuneration committee, must increase their accountability as they are required to
justify their decisions.130 The IoD, whose members are directors from various
business sectors and even CEOs from large organizations, provides a detailed
128. JAY CULLEN, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN IMPERFECT FINANCIAL MARKET, 202 (Edward
Elgar, 2014).
129. GC100 and Investor Group, Directors’ Remuneration Reporting Guidance 2016,
http://uk.practicallaw.com/groups/uk-gc100-investor-group [perma.cc/E8E9-FEZV].
130. ANDREW KEAY, BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 230 (Abingdon,
Routledge, 2015).
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introduction to the regular work of remuneration committees in setting pay
policy.131
First, good knowledge of running the business is critical to ensure that
compensation is set at an accurate level in relation to basic salary in comparison
with peer companies. Second, they need to think of financial factors and markets,
which will help them with setting pay for performance criteria associated with
shareholder returns, including annual bonuses and incentive plans. Third, the
company’s culture must be taken into account, since remuneration should reflect
the organization’s values and culture. The remuneration committee members,
especially the independent directors, need to recognize the company’s values
related to successful performance, and avoid cutting bonuses and risking the
company’s competitiveness. At this stage, questions may logically be raised about
how these considerations by the board and remuneration committee may be
effectively enforced in practice. Detailed solutions to this question will be
discussed as follows.
i. The Power of the Advisory Vote
Governments tend to provide shareholders with a say on pay to intervene in
remuneration practice by improving board and remuneration committee
accountability. Under the principles produced by NAPF and other institutional
investors in relation to remuneration reports, there is a full explanation of the pay
plan, a deeper analysis of company performance and a well-debated decision based
on a broader comparison with peer companies, which will help to build trust
between investors and remuneration committees.132
However, only in some circumstances the remuneration committee respond to
a negative vote result. A few cases show voting alone may affect the remuneration
outcome.133 Nonetheless, institutional shareholders should show and have already
shown interest in seeing remuneration committees increase their authority while
negotiating pay, and improve their will to undertake difficult tasks to punish
underperformance among executives.134
The Burberry case in 2014 and the BG Group case in 2015 is a key example to
investigate the remuneration committee accountability mechanisms’ effectiveness.
The Burberry remuneration committee provided their CEO with £28 million for his
first year’s compensation, which precipitated a revolt from the shareholders, with
52% voting against the proposal. At the time this was the highest veto percentage

131. IoD, The Remuneration Committee Role, http://www.iod.com/guidance/briefings/cgbis-therole-of-the-remuneration-committee [perma.cc/5CJ7-NDXW].
132. NAPF et al., supra note 49, at 3.
133. Sheehan, supra note 91.
134. NAPF et al., supra note 49, at 3.
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in UK history.135 On the other hand, the board of BG Group voluntarily gave up their
£25 million pay deal for the new CEO after shareholders showed strong disapproval
before the resolution day.136 At Burberry, the “golden hello,” worth £7.5m in shares
for the new CEO, already received a veto from 18% of their shareholders’ in 2014.137
These concerns were not unreasonable: the new CEO, Christopher Bailey, a designer
who had previously held the position of Burberry’s chief creative officer, was a new,
unexperienced incoming CEO. In 2015, a big fall in retail sales further caused the
company’s share price to fall by 4%, slashing the board’s pay decision and Mr.
Bailey’s high bonus, golden hello, and incentive stock pay.138
After the strong veto for the 2014 CEO remuneration proposal, the board provided
a new pay policy in the following year.139 With 92.3% of shareholders voting yes, the
revised pay policy in 2015 meant a reduction in Mr. Bailey’s income to £7.9m.140 This
high level of shareholder satisfaction was due to the board’s efforts in discussing
executive pay plans with the majority of their fifty biggest investors after the previous
year’s revolt.141 However, there were other problems with Burberry’s executive
remuneration policy, such as several inexplicable vested equity options in Bailey’s pay
structure that were set before he became CEO. The key lesson here is regulation can
be used to improve the board’s accountability. Remuneration committees and boards
should always show a willingness to facilitate and enhance communication with
shareholders on remuneration issues.
The case of the BG Group is another good example of conversing with
investors before a vote on pay policy to avoid public embarrassment.
Transparency in executive pay is not only about putting cold statistics in front of
the shareholders at the annual meeting, which may cause misunderstanding
between the board and shareholders. A process of negotiating and exchange of
opinions will improve the board’s accountability and enable a transparent
executive remuneration process.

135. Zoe Wood, Burberry shareholders revolt over Christopher Bailey’s pay package, THE
GUARDIAN (July 11, 2014) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jul/11/burberry-shareholdersrevolt-christian-bailey-pay-package [perma.cc/2L5N-ZFB3].
136. Sean Farrell, BG Group shareholders rebel against Helge Lund pay deal, THE GUARDIAN
(Apr. 5, 2015) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/may/05/bg-group-shareholders-rebel-again
st-helge-lund-pay-deal [perma.cc/VE3M-J22F].
137. Andrew Tritman, New Burberry CEO Christopher Bailey Handed £7.5m Golden Hello,
TELEGRAPH (May 15, 2014) https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/
10832465/New-Burberry-CEO-Christopher-Bailey-handed-7.5m-golden-hello.html [perma.cc/K5CKNVVN].
138. Andrew Roberts, Burberry to Slash CEO Bailey’s Pay Amid Chinese Sales Slump,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Oct. 15, 2015) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-15/burber
ry-to-slash-ceo-bailey-s-pay-amid-chinese-sales-slump [perma.cc/72X5-RR6S].
139. Shane Hickey, Burberry Investors Approve Chief Executive’s Pay, THE GUARDIAN (July 16,
2015) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/16/burberry-christopher-bailey-investors-appro
ve-pay [perma.cc/2P97-4PLQ].
140. Id.
141. Id.
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The reform of executive remuneration design carried out in the UK in 2013
separates companies’ pay implementation reports from their future remuneration
policies. If a majority of the shareholders rejects the previous year’s pay
implementation report, the board and remuneration committee should present a
new pay policy in the next year’s annual meeting, for shareholders to vote on; this
vote is binding. This regulation is valuable to corporate governance since it helps
to increase the engagement of shareholders in policymaking and urges boards to
enhance their communication with investors, especially institutional investors,
thereby improving board accountability. The process of how a board might carry
out a major review of compensation policy in practice may be illustrated in the
following form142:

• Terms of reference agreed with remuneration consultants
• December

Terms

• Interviews
• Questionnaires
• Desktop datamining exercise
• January‐February

Data

• Preliminary recommendations presented in a draft report
• Draft Report discussed with each remuneration committee member separately
• Revised draft presented to remuneration committee chair
• Late February

Option

Board Decision

Change Strategy

Engaegement

Final Decision
and Resolution

• Paper with recommendations for board approval
• Presentations by remuneration consultants to support board paper
• Outcomes: in‐principle agreement to change and adoption of particular changes
• March

• Practicalities and details of changes identified and strategy for implementation devised
• April

• Engagement with key institutional shareholders and proxy advisers
• Letters and/or meetings
• Responses may inform final board decision but do not necessarily alter proposal for approval
• May

• Decision to proceed with change
• June

Source: Sheehan “The Regulation of Executive Compensation” p.90

142.

Sheehan, supra note 91, at 90.
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Remuneration committees should engage in a regular review of executive pay
implementation reports, and major reviews of any new remuneration policy. As
shown above, after a failure to pass the shareholders’ advisory vote on a
remuneration report, the remuneration committee will examine the terms of the
previous policy, collect data from a wider perspective and re-value the equity
holdings of executives to provide a new calculation of the executive rewards.
More importantly, they will increase the pre-voting negotiation opportunities with
shareholders in case this policy also faces a revolt, because the previously rejected
remuneration report may have made a bad impression on investors. The UK
Corporate Governance Code requires that “the chairman of the board should
ensure that the committee chairman maintains contact as required with its principal
shareholder about remuneration.”143 The voting procedure would not be the only
opportunity for shareholders to express their opinion on executive pay policy;
negotiations before or after shareholder voting on pay could also enhance board
accountability.
How to balance the needs of shareholders and executive managers is always a
central question for the board. In the current legislation environment, the board can
use various regulations as good opportunities to communicate with shareholders
and managers. The importance of dialogue between the board and executive
directors about their pay will be discussed in the following section.
ii. Independence and Negotiation with Executives
Regulatory measures are unlikely to have a direct influence on board
independence. The independence of the board is influenced by the relationship
between non-executives and executive directors. Although personal factors will
have a good deal of impact on the remuneration committee’s judgment,
independence can still be built upon these non-executives’ analysis of the
executives’ behavior, and the non-executives’ pursuit of decisions which may
benefit both the company and the executives144 However, board accountability
alone may not be sufficient for developing a sound executive remuneration
mechanism, as “the directors on remuneration committees also need to be
competent.”145 Under most circumstances, executive remuneration policy is
primarily the outcome of negotiations between boards and their executive
managers, or managers-to-be.146 Before negotiating with shareholders as described
above, the pay policy will already have been drawn up under the guidance of
managers. Thus, how to start and maintain the dialogue with managers in order to
arrive at a rational pay policy is very important for boards and remuneration
committees.

143.
144.
145.
146.

FRC, supra note 6, D.2 Procedure, Supporting Principles.
Sheehan, supra note 91, at 65.
Id.
Executive Pay: Neither Rigged Nor Fair, THE ECONOMIST, June 25, 2016, at 20.
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The Yahoo case from 2016 is helpful to explain how this negotiation can
occur in practice. In 2012, soon after Marissa Mayer, the former vice-president of
Google, was hired as Yahoo’s CEO, she was approached by another Google
president, Henrique de Castro.147 Ms. Mayer told the board of Yahoo that she was
negotiating with a talented person who would fit the position of COO (chief
operating officer) perfectly, but she needed an attractive pay package in order to
negotiate.148 However, the board members of Yahoo had little knowledge of the
candidate because Ms. Mayer did not disclose his identity.149 The new CEO
provided Yahoo’s remuneration committee with a pay plan for the new COO
herself. In a meeting lasting half an hour one day later the committee agreed to
this pay plan,150 but stipulated that if any material change was made to the plan,
only the committee had the authority to approve it.151 After this meeting, the
Yahoo board suspected that Mr. de Castro was the person with whom their CEO
was negotiating.152 One month later, Mr. de Castro was hired as the new COO at
Yahoo. Many changes had been made to his pay plan without the consent of the
remuneration committee, but the remuneration committee did not take any
action.153
After the termination of Mr. de Castro at Yahoo due to
underperformance in 2014, he took his severance pay, valued at nearly $60 million
with $40 million of this in cash.154 Nonetheless, the equity options he chose to
exercise before his departure were only worth $51 million at the time he left the
company.155
It is no longer shocking to see underperforming executives walk away with
huge amounts of money after they have resigned or been terminated. However, it
is shocking that legislation emphasizes independence of boards and remuneration
committees, but it remains so deficient in practice. Perhaps Yahoo was just an
extreme case where the board ignored the negotiation process, but it does raise
questions about why big companies like Yahoo are so eager to attract directors on
big salaries. One of the reasons why executives may receive unreasonably high
levels of pay is due to the labor market for senior managers. First, executive
managers have a general idea themselves about what level of pay they can expect
based on comparison with their peers working in the same industry. Second, the
pool of talented and skilled candidates from which the company could hire and

147. Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 761 (Del. Ch. 2016).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 762.
150. Id. at 762.
151. Id. at 762.
152. Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 762 (Del. Ch. 2016).
153. Id. at 763.
154. Jim Edwards, Yahoo’s COO Walks Out with $20 Million Stock Bonus Plus $40 Million for
just 15 Month’s Work, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 15, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/yahoo-cooenrique-de-castro-has-stock-bonus-pay-package-2014-1 [perma.cc/T4X3-3BQY].
155. Joseph Bachelder, Hiring and Firing a Key Executive at Yahoo, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 22, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/22/hiring-andfiring-a-key-executive-at-yahoo/ [perma.cc/6RDD-XYKV].
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choose within one industry is very small, particularly for senior management
positions in public companies. Company are under huge pressure to offer
attractive pay packages to attract new talent while retaining existing employees.
Thus, another issue that the board and remuneration committee need to consider is
“peer group pay analysis” from remuneration consultants.
On the subject of remuneration consultants, it is their duty to provide market data
from peer group companies. There is no exclusive requirement for the accuracy of
their market advice. However, these consultants should provide opinions to the
remuneration committee fairly and responsibly in terms of their independence and
care.156 The UK is a good example of coordinating consultants’ services, creating a
remuneration consulting group in 2009 and producing a Code of Conduct in 2011.
Revised in 2014, this Code of Conduct aims at clarifying the role of remuneration
consultants in providing information, analysis, and advice on the level and structure of
executive pay, ensuring they are making the most informed decisions according to an
organization’s strategy, financial situation, and pay philosophy.157
With general regulations in the Anglo-American system paying too much
attention to conflicts of interest between consultants and companies,158 other
practical concerns should also be observed. These concerns may include setting
standards for selecting comparative peer groups, the selection of equity incentive
measures, and benchmarking for bonuses.
Further, with current regulations and rules already defined in terms of the
remuneration consultant’s independent role in remuneration design,159 a future
regulatory framework to solve the concerns above could easily be provided based
on this independence.
C. SUGGESTIONS
From the above, there are three concerns in relation to board accountability
and remuneration committees. First, with legislative requirements for the
transparency of pay increasing over the years, boards and remuneration
committees must ensure that various data are easy to understand without the risk of
leaving investors in confusion. Second, the shortcomings of pay policy design are
still obvious. Pay for underperformance and even for failure still exists in various
industries. Third, with the help of legislation, boards and remuneration committees
should learn how to negotiate better with both shareholders and directors with
regard to pay design.

156. Sheehan, supra note 91, at 75.
157. Voluntary Code of Conduct in Relation to Executive Remuneration Consulting in the UK,
(Jan. 2014), http://www.remunerationconsultantsgroup.com [https://perma.cc/5FQJ-TCYE].
158. Brian Cadman, Mary Carter & Stephen Hillegeist, The Incentives of Compensation
Consultants and CEO Pay, 49 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 263, 265 (2010); see also Kevin Murphy & Tatiana
Sandino, Executive Pay and Independent Compensation Consultants, 49 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 247,
249–50 (2010).
159. Sheehan supra note 91, at 76.
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i. Reporting
With the fraction of equity incentives increasing significantly in executives’
total pay and structure, the complexity of the pay policy always leaves
shareholders confused, and means they have to rely heavily on advisory groups for
their voting decisions. This phenomenon is not only inconvenient for the
shareholders, but also allowed directors to make the presumption that shareholders
are voting irresponsibly, such as in the JP Morgan case.160 A sound pay plan or
pay report should ensure that shareholders have sufficient information to vote
upon, knowing what to expect in the following year and avoiding the risk of
unexpected outcomes in future pay reports.161 In the UK Corporate Governance
Code, it is the board’s responsibility to present “fair, balanced and understandable”
reports to shareholders and other stakeholders.162 However, in practice the
guidelines from NAPF et al. suggest although many listed companies have longterm incentive plans and deferred bonuses designed for their executives,
shareholders are not able to read and understand the multiple equity options and
bonus schemes.163
There are usually several financial incentives in the
remuneration policy and report, with various different performance conditions set
for them.
For an example, Tesco’s 2015 remuneration report had several limitations.
First, in its single total figure for each executive director’s remuneration, though it
provides every element of pay clearly in a table, the report showed no data on how
many shares each executive was granted.164 Shareholders need to have a general
view of the quantities of shares that may be held by executives, together with their
salaries, bonuses, and other figures. This then provides an overall picture. Second,
in the “loss of company” section (also called the “loss of office”), there is no form
to explain how much the company is going to pay its departing executives in total,
or any explanation of why its former CEO would be granted various payments and
benefits.165 Compared to the 2013-2014 remuneration report which received only
a 1.38% revolt from its shareholders, this 2014-2015 implementation report led
nearly 19% of the shareholders to vote negatively.166 Besides shareholders’
dissatisfaction about Tesco’s share price drop during 2014 and 2015, part of the

160. Simon Bowers, JP Morgan Takes Advice from Firm That Its Chief Attacked, THE GUARDIAN
(June 15, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/15/jp-morgan-advice-jamie-dimonvoting [perma.cc/T77J-DJY6].
161. GC100 and Investor Group, supra note 129, at 5.
162. FRC, supra note 6, Section C, Accountability, C.1 Main Principle, “The board should present
a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s position and prospects.”
163. NAPF et al., supra note 49, at 4.
164. Tesco PLC Annual Report and Financial Statements 2015, TESCO, https://www.tesco
plc.com [perma.cc/5XUN-R8Z5].
165. Id. at 55.
166. Sarah Butler, Tesco Faces Shareholder Unrest over Executive Pay, THE GUARDIAN (June 26,
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/26/tesco-sales-drop-13-but-outperform-marketexpectations [perma.cc/HJ82-BMZB].
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reason for this revolt was that the implementation report was not able to persuade
the shareholders.167 Deficiencies in remuneration reports have not only caused
confusion and dissatisfaction among investors, but have also led to concerns on the
part of boards about future remuneration policy making and the reputation of the
company. Apart from a regulatory procedure for remuneration practice, it would
be better if there were some requirements, or at least guidelines, from the
government about how to draft remuneration reports.
The UK Corporate Governance Code is a good example. In section D
Remuneration, a subsection (D.3 Conciseness) would be useful, offering guidance
on how the board and remuneration committee should explain the pay policy. This
subsection would help shareholders to make more informed decisions when they
vote.
i. Flexibility
In the cases of Morrisons and Tesco, in which now-departed CEOs were
highly paid for underperformance, the remuneration committee should also have
paid attention to the flexibility of the pay policy design. Boards need to ensure that
their pay policy arranges various elements of remuneration, subject to appropriate
adjustments at the discretion of the remuneration committee.168 Although
shareholders have an advisory vote on the compensation implementation report,
this power does not enable them to stop pay for failure. In 2016, cases from BP,
JPMorgan, Citibank and Volkswagen again emphasized the importance of the
implementation of remuneration design in practice. For example, BP’s CEO Bob
Dudley had his pay increased by 20% in 2016 for his performance in 2015, despite
the fact that BP experienced the worst loss in the oil industry in 2015.169 Even
though BP made a loss of $5.2 billion in 2015, the main rise in his remuneration
was from his pension savings, which increased due to a change in retirement
benefits, as well as his annual bonus which increased by 40% according to the
bonus target set by his remuneration policy.170
To prevent pay for failure, shareholders should have a binding vote on pay for
executives who leave the company in the next fiscal year after the AGM. It is
creative and wise of the UK 2013 remuneration reform to separate the power of the
shareholder say on pay into separate aspects of the remuneration policy and the
remuneration implementation report. However, the implementation of the policy
for executives departing because of poor performance and losses to the company
may require additional attention.
The French government also plans to propose a similarly flexible method of
167.
168.
169.

Id.
GC100 and Investor Group, supra note 129, at 5.
Kiran Stacey, Ed Crooks & Stephen Foley, BP Revives Investor Fury on Executive Pay, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/be44d458-024a-11e6-99cb-83242733f755 [perma.
cc/AY9Y-97BR].
170. Id.
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shareholder voting, where recent public outrage towards the motor giant Renault’s
ignorance of their shareholders’ revolt over the compensation of the company’s
CEO Carlos Ghosn reached the French government. On June 10, 2016, the French
National Assembly passed the Minister’s measure providing a stricter and more
binding shareholders’ say on pay for the remuneration of chief executives in public
companies.171 The reason why the French government reacted so quickly and
decisively to the Renault situation was partly because the French state owns a
considerable shareholding (20%) in this company, and the state voted no to the
CEO’s pay.172 It may seem overly restrictive for the French government to
propose new legislation against public companies’ ignorance of shareholder power
over such a short term. However, this reflects a significant corporate governance
issue. The intrinsic reason here was the lack of accountability of the board,
disregarding 54% of the shareholders who exercised their veto over the pay deal.173
The French government proposed to move further on shareholders’ say on pay than
the UK reform, requiring that shareholders have the power to vote on remuneration
implementation reports every year, on a binding basis.174 Surprisingly, this reform
was supported by French institutions and proxy groups, who rejected the claim that
the legislation provides excessive power to the shareholders.175 It seems that the
current excessive pay for failure has caused serious concerns.
The importance of a remuneration policy rests on its influence on the
remuneration set in the future, and the issue of how to align pay with performance.
On one hand, this is probably the reason why shareholders are given voting powers
on this issue, giving them the feeling that they are empowered to make decisions
for the company. On the other hand, however, implementation reports must not be
underestimated. From a practical point of view, the implementation report decides
the final scale of the remuneration of executives. Shareholders will not be satisfied
with a merely advisory vote on this report, and it is crucially important from the
point of view of board accountability that the board feels obliged to hear the
shareholders’ voice in implementing directors’ pay, especially for departing
executives who been involved in a loss to the company. Although it is difficult for
remuneration committees and boards to design the variable factors in executive
pay every year, this French proposal confirms the direction for legislation in other
countries, suggesting a way to stop pay for underperformance.
The revised section 430 (2B) of the UK Companies Act 2006, introduced in
the 2016 reform, provides:

171. Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, French Shareholders Win Say on Executive Pay, Legislation
follows dispute pitting Renault against shareholders, FIN. TIMES, June 10, 2016.
172. Lucy P Marcus, Why the Revolt Against Executive Pay Is Not Going Away, THE GUARDIAN,
May 22, 2016; see also Peter Campbell & Michael Stothard, French Government Leads Shareholder
Revolt against Renault, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2016.
173. Id.
174. French Assemblée Nationale, Amendment No. 14 to the French Commercial Code, http://
www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/3757/AN/14.asp [perma.cc/8REF-35VQ].
175. Campbell & Stothard, supra note 172.
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If a person ceases to be a director of a quoted company, the
company must ensure that the following information is made
available on the website on which its annual accounts and reports are
made available – (a) the name of the person concerned, (b)
particulars of any remuneration payment (within the meaning of
Chapter 4A of Part 10) made or to be made to the person after
ceasing to be a director, including its amount and how it was
calculated, and (c) particulars of any payment for loss of office
(within the meaning of that Chapter) made or to be made to the
person, including its amount and how it was calculated.
According to this provision, public companies should post an online statement
about any director leaving office, including how to calculate this director’s
remuneration according to her pre-agreed pay policy before the loss of office. This
transparency requirement, together with other requirements in relation to loss of
office payments from section 226, is quite helpful for shareholders to obtain
general information about the departing director. However, a symbolic nonbinding vote does not provide shareholders with enough power to stop pay for
failure.
iii. Negotiation and Responsibility
From the shareholders’ perspective, as summarized above, the way that the
UK reform separates the power of the shareholders’ say on pay should be noted by
other legislative regimes and governments. The binding vote on the future
remuneration policy did have some impact on the rapidly increasing trend of
executive pay. However, due to different political, economic, and cultural
backgrounds, a binding say on pay might not be suitable for every country—for
example Germany, which already has strong trade union representation on the
supervisory boards of large companies to monitor directors and their pay.
The design of the UK advisory vote on remuneration implementation reports
escalates communication between shareholders and enhances board accountability
towards shareholders.
As mentioned above, if boards and remuneration
committees in the UK do not wish to provide another remuneration policy within a
three-year period, they must have discussions with shareholders, especially large
institutional shareholders, before resolution, to gain a general idea of how they will
vote on the implementation report. This positive communication between boards
and shareholders may improve the quality of shareholder engagement and the
efficiency of remuneration reporting. An efficient legislative direction may be
more effective than a clean-cut requirement in the corporate governance code that
lacks enforcement measures, such as “the chairman of the board should ensure that
the committee chairman maintains contact as required with its principal
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shareholder about remuneration.”176 The reason why several large UK companies
upset their shareholders in relation to their implementation report for executive
remuneration was because the directors were leaving their companies and their
future pay policies were not due to be revised in the following fiscal year. This is
also another reason for introducing a binding say on pay for departing managers as
mentioned above, in order to stop pay for failure.
Learning from the Yahoo case and from other empirical evidence about board
independence from CEOs and other executive managers, improvements could be
made to the negotiations between boards and executive directors. Negotiations
between boards and managers may be less complicated compared with those
between boards and shareholders. However, it is not an easy job for boards and
their remuneration committees to maintain absolute independence during these
negotiations. According to the managerial power approach, Bebchuk et al. suggest
that executive managers are able to increase their own remuneration by using their
considerable power over boards and other independent directors on the
remuneration committee. Especially when companies are running smoothly, nonexecutive directors usually choose to cooperate with management teams within
their social networks.177 Even though corporate government codes in many
jurisdictions require non-executive directors on the remuneration committee, it is
almost impossible for remuneration committees to obtain independence from
executive directors. Moreover, a study collecting data from FTSE 350 companies
between 1996 and 2005 has shown that the composition of remuneration
committees has no statistical impact on the level of executive pay; the
independence of the remuneration committee cannot guarantee that executive
remuneration will remain at a reasonable level.178
We think it is necessary and significant to emphasize the responsibility of the
leaders, including the chairman of the board and the head of the remuneration
committee. Legislation could provide for appraisal schemes for every director of a
remuneration committee in order to evaluate their performance.
iv. Principles
Suggestions for legislation regulating remuneration committees and boards
may be summarized as follows:
1. To provide guidelines for corporate governance, encouraging
companies to provide concise remuneration reports to increase the efficiency
of shareholder voting and the boards’ work;
2. To make the shareholders’ vote on the remuneration report for
departing executive managers binding, in order to prevent pay for failure;
176. FRC, supra note 6, Section D.2: Procedure.
177. Lucian Bebchuk, Jessie Fried & David Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 768 (2002).
178. Ian Gregory-Smith, Chief Executive Pay and Remuneration Committee Independence, 74
OXFORD BULLITIN OF ECON. & STAT. 510, 522 (2012).
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3. To pursue the responsibility of the board and its remuneration
committee for any lack of negotiation during the creation of the
remuneration policy and report.

III. REMUNERATION DESIGN: HOW TO IMPROVE
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE
“A variety of legal persons are targeted by the regulation: listed companies,
boards of directors, remuneration committees, individual executives/directors,
institutional investors and shareholders.”179 The law only gives guidelines for
progress which executive managers and the board can easily hide behind. Thus,
we should pay special attention to remuneration policy design.
The International Corporate Governance Network suggests that there should
be three factors to test executive remuneration practice: transparency,
accountability, and pay for performance. Transparency means that shareholders
and the public are able to obtain detailed information and monitoring rights with
regard to the remuneration of executive directors, a matter discussed in the first
section in this article. The accountability of the board and remuneration committee
to shareholders in terms of the practice of executive compensation, which should
be improved, was analyzed in the second section. However, these factors are both
intended to achieve the third goal, which is pay for performance.
Pay for performance is the ultimate goal of executive remuneration practices
under various theories that have been proposed to explain remuneration. The
following section will present a brief analysis of how to link pay with performance
in practice, and summarize the difficulties of regulating pay for performance from
a legislative perspective.
A. SETTING FOR PERFORMANCE
Normally, most executive pay policies are set on an ex ante basis, where the
level and structure of directors’ compensation packages are influenced by business
conditions and the size of companies. Executive remuneration levels and company
performance may be conditional on the companies’ investment opportunities.180
Because directors’ actions are seldom observable to shareholders, shareholders
have to make investments or offer to hire executive directors based on measures
they can observe, aligned to firm performance. Normally, because the ability to
observe executives’ actions is decreasing, incentive compensation, which indicates

179. Sheehan, supra note 45, at 33.
180. Clifford Smith & Ross Watts, The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing,
Dividend and Compensation Policies, 32 J. OF FIN. ECON. 263, 280–81 (1992).
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market performance, is increasing.181
Developing from these empirical
investigations, Baber et al. found that shareholders’ investments are associated
with the company’s market-based performance, rather than its accounting-based
performance, while the executive directors’ stock incentive compensation is a
crucial consideration in the investors’ judgments.182 Because shareholders invest
in the firm based on information about its managers’ stock income, there may be
situations where executives increase their pay level or manipulate share prices to
attract investment opportunities. Baber et al. inferred from their research that the
influence of market-based performance factors on shareholders’ investment will
encourage cynical executive action to attract shareholder interest.183
Interference from legislation and government, as mentioned above, may
provide several methods to solve or at least mitigate such situations. If there is
little legislative intervention endowing shareholders with voting rights and
regulating an independent remuneration committee, there may be misalignments
between executive compensation and performance. Klapper and Love engaged in
a study of 495 public companies from various countries across twenty-five
emerging markets and eighteen sectors, with the purpose of investigating the
relationship between country-level shareholder rights and national judicial
efficiency. The researchers found that companies in countries with weak legal
systems normally have lower governance rankings in the international data, and
under those weak legislative situations a company’s good performance is more
positively correlated with better market-based and accounting performance.184
With weak regulations and poor governance, directors’ managerial power can
easily influence pay policy, leading to a misalignment of pay and performance.
However, there is little guidance from legislation about how to evaluate
remuneration policy design. Regulations about managers’ compensation should
also consider the influence of both market-based performance and accountingbased performance standards for executive remuneration policy. Market-based
performance is measured against the company’s stock market return, while
accounting-based performance concerns the accounting return on the company’s
equities. Executives’ income is explicitly tied to stock-price performance through
performance-related changes according to the value of their stockholdings,
restricted stock options, and long-term stock options.
Pay performance
sensitivities represent the executives’ share of the value that they have created.
When shareholders’ wealth increases by $1, the value of executives’ restricted and
unrestricted stockholdings will increase in line with executives’ ownership of their

181. Jennifer Gaver & Kenneth Gaver, Additional Evidence on the Association Between the
Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend and Compensation Policies, 16 J. OF
ACCT. & ECON. 125, 155 (1993).
182. William Baber, Surya Janakiraman & Sok-Hyon Kang, Investment Opportunities and the
Structure of Executive Compensation, 21 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 297, 315 (1996).
183. Id.
184. Leora Klapper & Inessa Love, Corporate Governance, Investor Protection and Performance
in Emerging Markets, 10 J. OF CORP. FIN. 703, 723 (2004).
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company’s shares185 Additionally, these two performance standards each have an
impact on the other. Executive income is indirectly tied to stock-price
performance through accounting-based bonuses, which reflects the correlation
between accounting returns and stock-price performance, and also through annual
adjustments of salary levels and target bonuses.186
Earlier studies have confirmed theoretical assumptions that there is a linear
relationship between executive compensation and performance from market and
accounting perspectives.187 In Lambert and Larcker’s comparative research, they
propose that cash remuneration exhibits a stronger positive time-series relation
with accounting-based performance, while market-based performance only has a
modest time-series influence on cash pay.188 They also suggest that companies that
are developing quickly tend to place more emphasis on executives’ market-based
performance than on their accounting-based performance.189
Apart from executive directors’ management behavior, other uncontrollable
factors could also decrease the relative weight that these two performance factors
have on executive compensation levels.190 These factors are illustrated under two
perspectives: (1) under the force of the stock market, calculating pay-performance
sensitivities from the executives’ option holdings aspect is more difficult than for
stock holdings, since option values do not change dollar-for-dollar with changes in
share prices;191 and (2) financial incentives in pay are created depending on various
factors, including the executive’s portfolio and the company’s future risk
preference.192 Argarwal and Samwich suggest that the level of corporate risk,
which is also known as the firm return variance, is an important determinant of the
level of remuneration for executives, and it is “robust” across the other measures of
firm risk.193 According to these financial studies, failure to allocate company risk
to compensation incentives will underestimate the real pay for performance
relation.194
Even with regulations providing shareholders with voting rights and requiring
the independence of boards and remuneration committees, previous factors such as
185. KEVIN MURPHY, Executive Compensation: Where we are and how we got there, in
HANDBOOK OF ECON. & FIN., G. 25 (Constantinides ed., 2013).
186. Id.
187. Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 89–90 (1979);
Rajiv Banker & Srikant Datar, Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Accounting Signals, 27
J. ACCT. RES. 21, 34–35 (1989).
188. Richard Lambert & David Larcker, An Analysis of the Accounting and Market Measures of
Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts, 25 J. ACCT. RES., Studies on Stewardship Uses of
Accounting Information 85, 113 (1987).
189. Id. at 114–15.
190. Id.
191. Murphy, supra note 185, at 37.
192. Id.
193. Rajesh Aggarwal & Andrew Samwick, Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and
Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence, 54 THE J. FIN. 1999, 2032 (1999).
194. Paul Gregg, Sarah Jewell & Ian Tonks, Executive Pay and Performance in the UK, 9 AXA
Working Paper No. 5, Discussion Paper No. 657, 2010.
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excessive pay for failures and wrongful incentive design to encourage executives
to take unreasonable risks can be all explained according to these two
uncontrollable factors, which are always ignored by regulations. Therefore, in this
section these situations will be investigated and various methods that legislation
can utilize will be discussed.
B. PAY STRUCTURE
i. Long-term Equity Option Vesting Period
The most serious problem in relation to the realization of executive directors’
equity options, especially with long-term incentive plans (LTIPs), is that there are
no requirements on the length of the post-exercise period in the current
legislation.195 Several issues in relation to long-term equity options need special
attention from remuneration committees. These issues include a long vesting
period, usually lasting five to ten years, an exercise point at which the executive
directors can claim their ownership of the shares, a post-exercise period during
which the director will hold the shares, and finally a transferability point at which
they can sell the shares for cash. Because there currently is no limitation on the
holding period, under most circumstances executives will use their power to push
share prices to a high level and sell their shares immediately after the exercise
point. This type of managerial behavior, focusing on short-term profits, will
certainly jeopardize companies’ long-term success and shareholders’ long-term
interests.
Equity markets and product markets may sometimes help with pay for
underperformance. Under good industrial performance or if the company has
performed badly on previous occasions, the equity options of executive managers
will increase dramatically without any effort on their part due to long-term
incentives, such as improvements in the company’s share prices.196 Peer group
review is a method that remuneration committee can use to avoid paying
executives for under-performance. This type of review includes an evaluation of
the level and structure of executive pay given by comparative companies in the
same industry. This analysis may be carried out by the remuneration committee,
by remuneration consultants, and sometimes even by the managers.197 The reason
why the companies and remuneration consultants should pay attention to this
comparison is that shareholders, especially institutional shareholders, already
recognize peer group reviews as a general performance measure for long-term
incentive plans.198

195. McClendon, supra note 107.
196. Diago DiMartino, Are CEOs Hiding Behind Long-term Awards? Trend Towards Incentives
Opens Another Chapter in Compensation Debate, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 1, 2003.
197. Sheehan, supra note 91, at 124–25.
198. ABI, Association of British Insurers, 2008, Executive contracts and Severance Guidelines
from ABI and NAPF, https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-releases/2008/02/Executive-contracts-andseverance-Guidelines-from-ABI-and-NAPF [perma.cc/ASY5-5GKC].

1 - EXECRENUMERATIONMACROFINAL SL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2019

4/19/2019 10:56 AM

EXECUTIVE RENUMERATION

243

Perhaps long-term incentive plans may work better if corporate governance
codes, or even legislation such as the Companies Act, were to require that these
equity options be exercisable at least three to five years after the vesting period.
This will be particularly relevant for executives who have left companies with their
work accomplished. These long-term vested equities prove that they have
contributed to the companies’ long-term productivity. Even though they are not
able to claim their money, the companies would normally reward and compensate
them with other bonuses, short-term incentives, and benefits. If executives are
dismissed or resign because of underperformance, companies will probably cancel
their long-term incentive plans.
For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code states that:
for share-based remuneration the remuneration committee
should consider requiring directors to hold a minimum number of
shares and to hold shares for a further period after vesting or
exercise, including for a period after leaving the company, subject to
the need to finance any costs of acquisition and associated tax
liabilities. In normal circumstances, shares granted or other forms of
deferred remuneration should not vest or be paid, and options should
not be exercisable, in less than three years. Longer periods may be
appropriate. Grants under executive share options and other longterm incentive schemes should normally be phased in rather than
awarded in one large block.199
According to Deloitte’s study on the executive remuneration reports of FTSE
250 companies, 80% of the long term incentive plans of investigated companies
now incorporate a post-vesting holding period.200 It may be observed that
Schedule A has provided a good example in encouraging public companies to
adopt a longer holding period in long-term incentive plans. This improvement has
also shown that, under good direction from regulation, it is possible to develop and
adjust the structure of executive remuneration policy and regulate it through soft
law.
Also, if governments feel that this legislation has intervened too heavily in the
governance issues of public companies, institutional shareholders can strongly
recommend in their remuneration guidelines that their investee companies should
provide longer vesting periods in their equity incentives.
As the next step to promote a longer holding period for exercisable shares, this
paper proposes regulations to push remuneration committees to provide reasons in
remuneration policies together with using the expertise of consultants from peer
group analysis.
199. FRC, supra note 6, at 24.
200. Deloitte, Your Guide: Directors’ remuneration in FTSE 250 companies, (Oct. 2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/tax/deloitte-uk-tax-your-guide-direc
tors-remuneration-in-ftse-250-companies.pdf [perma.cc/FS9V-XHLE].
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ii. Short-term incentive options
The HSBC case is worth discussing as it raises several interesting points
concerning pay policy design. The HSBC remuneration committee proposed a
policy to benefit the long-term profits of the company in 2011. Top executives
would only be able to sell their equity options after their retirement.201 From the
remuneration structure discussion above, it is positive that these top executives in
the banking sectors must maintain their equity holdings for a longer time. The
HSBC remuneration committee designed their long-term incentive plan with five
years as a vesting period, in order to promote the company’s future success.
This policy has influenced the level of pay of HSBC’s CEO, Stuart Gulliver;
his pay was £12.5 million in 2011, but his remuneration was £7.4 million, £8
million and £7.6 million from 2012 to 2014 respectively.202
However,
shareholders were confused by the criteria suggested by John Thornton, the
chairman of the remuneration committee at that time, which suggested measuring
the share awards in a way that was not based on the company’s share returns.203
Also, in 2015 nearly 23.7% of the HSBC shareholders voted against the CEO’s
pay report, compared with 16% in 2014 and 11% in 2013 because of some
misconduct in investing and a sudden increase in Gulliver’s basic salary.204 The
increase in the shareholder veto in 2014 was due to the newly introduced EU
executive bonus cap rule, whereby executive bonuses and other financial
incentives cannot be more than 100% of their salary, or 200% with the
shareholders’ approval. Gulliver’s salary increased by 70%, from £2.5m to £4.2m,
and he complained that “we had a compensation plan here that the shareholders
liked but sadly because of the EU directive we’ve had to change it. This isn’t
something we would have wanted to do. … It’s much more complicated.”205
Thus, although long-term incentives are now the most contentious issue in
executive pay packages, other elements such as bonus plans and other short-term
incentives also have an impact on total pay levels and shareholders’ attitudes
towards pay reports.
With the use of restricted share options and long-term equity plans increasing
rapidly since the late 1990s and during the 2000s, managers took “unnecessary and
excessive” risks to enhance share prices up to 2008, which brought the attention of

201. Masa Serdarevic & Patrick Jenkins, HSBC Proposes Pay Shake-Up, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 22,
2011.
202. Graham Hiscott, HSBC boss earns 500 times more than bank’s lowest paid workers last year,
DAILY MIRROR, Mar. 2013; see also Vivek Ahuja, Here’s What HSBC’s Best-Paid Executives Earned,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2014.
203. Jill Treanor, Investors split over HSBC plans to shake up executive bonuses, THE GUARDIAN,
Mar. 21, 2011.
204. Martin Arnold, Almost A third of investors refuse to back HSBC pay, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2015.
205. Ian Johnston, HSBC Stuart Gulliver to get 70% pay rise – taking his salary to £4.2m a year,
THE INDEPENDENT. (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/hsbc-stuartgulliver-to-get-70-pay-rise-taking-his-salary-to-42m-a-year-9150504.html [perma.cc/YC8P-V3ER].
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the public and governments to focus on managers’ compensation.206 In 2010 longterm incentive options made up 47.8% of the total pay of the U.S. Fortune 500
companies, compared with 44.7% in 2006; in the UK, FTSE 350 executives
received their remuneration with long-term incentives comprising 49.6% in 2010
and 39.7% in 2006.207 As discussed above, measures such as increasing the
vesting periods for long-term equity plans, recovering deferred bonuses, and
reducing golden parachutes were already implemented before the financial
crisis.208 Their role in linking performance and pay, and how to regulate them in
law, will be analyzed next.
Short-term incentives, normally annual bonuses and restricted equity options,
may be granted to executive managers after a conditional period, which is shorter
compared to long-term incentive options. These short-term incentive plans are
more heavily influenced by the company’s business strategy and financial status
compared with long-term incentive plans, which are mainly designed to promote
long-term relationships with executives. Executives tend to sell all of their shares
after the vesting period, so it is in their own personal interest to boost the share
prices before selling, or to focus excessively on short-term prices for those
options while neglecting the long-term performance of the firm.209
In our opinion, the rules for reporting short-term incentive pay should be
embedded in the corporate governance code, under the “comply or explain”
principle. Under Murphy’s theory, the economic cost of companies granting
equity options should be emphasized and calculated as if the companies did not
grant those shares to its managers. Murphy suggests that, first, remuneration
committees and boards should calculate their company’s income as if its executive
managers were not granted short-term share plan.210 After this calculation,
remuneration committees and boards can include these figures in the company’s
remuneration report, or even show what the company has spent on granting shares
to managers instead of selling them to outside investors. This requirement will
improve the transparency of pay reporting, and promote the long-term success of
the company through shareholder engagement and monitoring.
NAPF’s institutional shareholders alliance principle on executive
remuneration suggests that there has been too much debate between companies and

206. Phred Dvorak & Joann Lublin, Bailout’s Bid to Limit Executive Pay Will Be Tough to
Realize, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2008 at B.5.
207. The Conference Board, The US Top Executive Compensation Report, https://www.confer
ence-board.org/publications/publicationdetail.cfm?publicationid=2848 [perma.cc/QZ6W-49HV]; see
also Income Data Services, Directors’ Pay Report, http://www.incomesdata.co.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2014/10/IDS-FTSE-100-directors-pay-20141.pdf [perma.cc/G72V-MV55].
208. Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, Congress Passes New Limits on Executive
Compensation Paid by Troubled Financial Institutions, (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.sonnenschein.com/
pubs/e-alerts/Congress_Passes_New_.html [perma.cc/YE3H-D7L7].
209. Jessie Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading
Disclosures, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 365 (1998).
210. Murphy, supra note 159, at 249.
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investors around short-term or medium-term compensation designs.211 They
suggest that the current average three-year period of equity vesting in executive
pay may not be the best way to promote long-term success, particularly for the
largest and most complex companies such as those listed in the FTSE 100.212
Studies of executive compensation from the financial industry suggest that to stop
executive managers focusing on short-term profits and gaining excessive pay by
using strategies such as inflated asset prices, incentive plans should be extended to
five to ten years, not only for long-term equity plans but also for restricted share
options.213
To promote the companies’ long-term success, Bhagat and Romano even
propose that financial incentives in executive pay should all be changed to
restricted stock or long-term stock options.214 The condition they suggest for
financial incentives is that after the vesting period executive directors should wait
for two to four years after their resignation or their last day in office to sell the
shares they already owned at the time of their departure.215
In terms of financial incentive development, short-term incentives may be
merged gradually with long-term incentive plans, because shareholders prefer to
invest in companies where executive remuneration is based more on long-term
share plans.216 However, due to the advantages of short-term options over longterm incentives, such as attracting new executive managers to join the business and
paying managers for short-term performance by encouraging long-term
commitment, investors seem to be more inclined to approve short-term plans.217
Thus, removing the pay element from the executive remuneration structure may
not be the best proposal.
C. FAIR PAY?
i. Fairness in Regulation
A central question surrounding government regulation of pay gaps is how far
the government can intervene in fairness issues.
Fair pay issues from company law and corporate governance perspectives can
be categorized according to two factors. First, how do pay gaps and inequality
between executive directors and employees in a company influence the lower-level
employees’ performance and the company’s long-term productivity? Second, do

211. NAPF et al., supra note 49, at 3.
212. Id.
213. Cullen, supra note 128, at 97.
214. Roberta Romano & Sanjai Bhagat, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and
Committing to the Long-Term, YALE L. & ECON. RES. Paper No. 374, at 2–4 (2009).
215. Id. at 2–3.
216. James Brickley, Sanjai Bhagat & Ronald Lease, The Impact of Long-Range Managerial
Compensation Plans to Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 115, 120 (1985).
217. ROBERT KOLB, TOO MUCH IS NOT ENOUGH: INCENTIVES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION,
160 (2012).
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directors consider inequality when they are making pay decisions? If so, under
what circumstances should regulation towards fairness occur?
Several studies show increasing dispersion in pay leads to lower productivity,
less cooperation, and larger threats to turnover.218 Hicks discussed the importance
of the psychology of workers in 1963, noting “it is also necessary that there should
not be strong feelings of injustice about the relative treatment of employees since
these would diminish the efficiency of the team.”219 Additionally, research
indicates companies will perform better with less dispersion in pay because the
employees are less resentful towards the executives and more willing to contribute
to the company.220
Therefore, a negative correlation can be postulated between higher executive
and employee compensation, and employee and company performance. Then, the
next essential question to arise will be how to address the problem of pay
inequality.
Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock studied 122 public companies over a five-year
period and proposed, first, CEO compensation is correlated positively with the
lower-level employees’ pay, and second, CEOs are concerned with fairness as well
as their own self-interest, and while they are negotiating to increase their own
payment they will also think about their subordinates and, if possible, the
employees.221
In August 2015 the U.S. government provided a disclosure requirement on the
ratio between the pay of regular employees and that of top executives. A new
section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act clarified that a public company’s pay policy
needs to give a record of the ratio of the total CEO remuneration to the median
total employee compensation, in effort to promote board accountability to
shareholders in relation to executive compensation practices.222 As noted by the
SEC Chair Mary Jo White, this rule “provides companies with substantial

218. Matt Bloom & John Michel, The Relationships among Organizational Context, Pay
Dispersion and Managerial Turnover, 45 ACAD. MAG. J. 33, 38 (2002); Jeffrey Pfeffer & Nancy
Langton, The Effect of Wage Dispersion on Satisfaction, Productivity and Working Collaboratively:
Evidence from College and University Faculty, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 382, 40 (1993).
219. JOHN HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES, 112 (St. Martin’s Press, 1963).
220. Olubunmi Faleye, Ebru Reis & Anand Venkateswaran, The Effect of Executive-Employee
Pay Disparity on Labour Productivity (Apr. 2010), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=
10.1.1.615.3427; Pedro Martins, Dispersion in Wage Premiums and Firm Performance, 8 CENTER FOR
GLOBALIZATION RES., 5 (2008); see also Douglas Cowherd & David Levine, Product Quality and Pay
Equity between Lower-level Employees and Top Management: An investigation of distributive justice
theory, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 302, 316–17 (1992).
221. James Wade, Charles O’Reilly, III & Timothy Pollock, Overpaid CEOs and Underpaid
Managers: Fairness and Executive Compensation, 17 ORG. SCI 9. 527, 539 (2006).
222. SEC Public Statement, The CEO Pay Ratio Rule: A Workable Solution for Both Issuers and
Investors, (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-open-meeting-on-pay-ratioaguilar.html [perma.cc/ZW4J-9DU3].
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flexibility in determining the pay ratio, while remaining true to the statutory
requirements.”223
From the SEC’s statements, this new provision aims to promote board
accountability for executive remuneration and flexibility in pay policy design by
providing shareholders with clear pay ratio information in annual reports, proxy
statements, and even registration statements. Though it touches on the topic of
reporting pay ratios in the pay report, this new rule says nearly nothing about
fairness in pay, or about narrowing the pay gap between CEOs and employees.
Although think tanks in the U.S. and the UK have both suggested that pay ratios
should be used to decrease pay gaps and inequality in the work place,224 the new
section in the Dodd-Frank Act does not seem to draw attention to these issues.
The rationale behind this disclosure requirement for pay ratios may be found
in the SEC’s proposal for amendments to Section 953(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act,
which requires listed companies to provide a clearer description of the relationship
between the executive compensation paid to the managers and the shareholders’
total share return. It also requires a description of the relationship between the
company’s total share return and the share return of comparative peer group
companies over the preceding five years, chosen by the compensation
committee.225 This proposed amendment will help shareholders by providing
detailed remuneration reports with additional information to enable them to vote
on remuneration issues.
The U.S. shareholder say on pay amendment stays at the advisory level.
Requiring a pay ratio to be reported in the proxy statements may provide
shareholders with a more general view of CEO pay levels. However, it rarely
provides ways to decrease pay gaps. Governments in the UK and the U.S. are still
focused on attracting investment for their public companies by providing
shareholders with more detailed information and the power to decide on pay
policies and reports. A possible solution may relate to redistribution, tax
regulation, or it may draw from another corporate governance model, for example
the German model. Providing shareholders with the power to veto proposals may
not be the best way to stop inequities in pay.

223. SEC Press Release, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure, (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.
sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html [perma.cc/S67B-28DN].
224. See Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), 2016 Executive Pay Reform Scorecard: Institute for
Policy Studies, Aug. 27, 2016, https://inequality.org/research/2014-executive-pay-reform-scorecard/
[perma.cc/5U8T-EYQF]; see also High Pay Centre, Reform Agenda: How to Make Top Pay Fairer,
(July 14, 2014), http://highpaycentre.org/pubs/reform-agenda-how-to-make-top-pay-fairer [perma.cc/
4K3H-TJD2].
225. Pay Versus Performance, SEC proposed rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-74835, File No.
S7-07-15 (proposed Apr. 29, 2015).
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ii. Having Employees on the Board?
The German corporate governance model certainly does not suit every
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it does provide some useful lessons. The Volkswagen
case shows that to reassess executive pay for underperformance, it is not enough to
have employees on the board. After the German auto giant’s emissions scandal in
2016, the management board members’ bonuses were cut by 30%.226 However,
this reduction in executive pay did not assuage Volkswagon shareholder
dissatisfaction.227 TCI, an aggressive UK-based activist investor with £993 million
invested in Volkswagen, published a letter to the company’s management and
supervisory boards about the shareholders’ requirements for executive
remuneration reform.228 In the letter, this TCI suggested that the reason why
managers in Volkswagen could be paid for underperformance was due to their
efforts to save unnecessary job losses and increase employees’ wages.229 Because
the company has employees representing the German Labor Union on its
supervisory board, and because these employee representatives have the power to
decide how to pay management teams, it becomes crucial and logical for
executives to devote extra attention to employees’ interests to maintain their
compensation level. After an evaluation of Volkswagen’s recent cash-flow and
payouts, TCI also pointed out that shareholders should have the power to monitor
executive pay practice by annual voting on the remuneration report and via
intervention from investors, another potential route for more effective executive
pay practice.230
Besides this letter, governance experts have also expressed concerns about
having employees on the board. Their first concern is the accountability of the
board. Under German law, half of the supervisory board seats are reserved for
employees, who are likely to lack professional management knowledge. This lack
of expertise may undermine board accountability to shareholders. Since 2002, the
chairman of Volkswagen has discussed business issues with the workers’ council
and agreed a position first, then brought it to the shareholders—unlike the situation
in the UK, where the chairman arrives at a common position with the shareholders
firsts and then talks with the board.231 A former Volkswagen executive once said

226. Jan Schwartz, VW Management Accepts Bonus Cuts of at least 30 percent: source, REUTERS
(Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-uaw-idUSKCN0XA1WU [perma.cc/6
C5Z-D3RR].
227. John Rosevear, Volkswagen Shareholders Are Fuming Over Executive Pay, The Motley Fool
(May 7, 2016), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/05/07/will-volkswagen-face-a-shareholderrevolt.aspx [perma.cc/S4RZ-H6EG].
228. Miles Johnson & Patrick McGee, TCI Launches Campaign Against Executive Pay at
Volkswagen, FIN. TIMES, May 6, 2016.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Richard Milne, Volkswagen: System failure, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.ft.
com/content/47f233f0-816b-11e5-a01c-8650859a4767 [perma.cc/X7EH-ZG3L].
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that “the board was really a show.”232 Although there are employee representatives
on the board, these representatives do not seem to be active in performing their
monitoring and supervising job as expected. Current and former employee
representatives of Volkswagen supervisory board have stated that they knew
nothing of the company’s emissions cheating and had never discussed engine
issues with any other director.233
The second concern comes from the board’s interaction. To ensure that
employee representatives are willing to allow a generous pay package, executives
may place too much emphasis on gaining employees’ favour and support,
neglecting payback for shareholders and the whole company’s interests. Tilley
noted that to regain the public’s trust on executive remuneration, it is necessary to
ensure that a pay policy is “embedded with a strategy for delivering long-term
sustainable corporate growth.234 Companies’ long-term interests should be set as
the main goal of remuneration design and practice, rather than the balance among
the interests of shareholders, managers and employees. The employee monitoring
function aims to improve the independence of the board and the remuneration
committee. However, if employee representatives start leaning towards increasing
managers’ pay for underperformance, the problem will be the same with nonexecutive independent directors; in fact, it may be even worse, since independent
directors may not have a strong relationship with the company. One lesson to be
learnt from Volkswagen is that governments should consider carefully before
introducing legislation that accommodates employee representatives on the board.
There have been several other suggestions, such as having more employees
holding the equity of the company; “broader capital ownership would curb income
and wealth inequality, expand investment and employment, and reduce the demand
for redistribution through the state.”235 This may be a wise option to enable a
company to benefit and retain valued employees. However, from the legislation
perspective, it is not the duty of either the Companies Act or a corporate
governance code to intervene that much. On the other hand, if benefitting and
retaining employees are to draw the attention of regulation, as in German
companies, perhaps regulations like this may not bring improvements for executive
remuneration.
Reports of an increase in general income and the recovery of pay in the public
sector may indicate that the UK government should refrain from introducing
additional regulation to promote fairness at the moment. Perhaps this overall
increase was one reason why the UK parliament turned down a law on reporting
pay ratios and placing employee representatives on boards to negotiate payment

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Charles Tilley, For Fair Pay, See Plato, THE GUARDIAN, June 3, 2010.
235. Robert Wade, Get Profits Share to Support a More Equal Income Distribution, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2015.
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issues.236 The UK is still a country with the default shareholder primacy norm
embedded in company law and corporate culture.237 Additionally, while workers’
wages are increasing at their fastest rate for six years,238 and in the context of the
UK’s smooth economic recovery, which has shown a decrease in unemployment
and inflation since 2011,239 there will be fewer opportunities to regulate for a pay
cap in this country. Pay inequality can be controlled by corporate governance, but
if long-term firm productivity is not affected by the pay gap, then inequity
problems may not addressed by law.

IV. CONCLUSION
Mooney suggested that executive remuneration should be simplified in
structure, and reforms should push companies to reduce the complexity of their
reports.240 However, this suggestion for simplifying pay structures probably stems
from only a partial understanding of pay structures and practices. It is difficult to
avoid complexity in executive pay because it derives from variation in the
incentives set for managers, even though these incentive’s aims can be stated
simply and clearly in pay reports and policies. It is the job of remuneration
committees and boards to make those aims accountable to shareholders for
resolution. Since the movement in favor of “shareholder say on pay” has become a
popular legislative approach but also has proved to have implementation
difficulties, current regulations should build upon present foundations to improve
the quality of shareholder monitoring.
Due to variation in cultures and industries, each government has a unique
method of regulating remuneration practice. This article only provides suggestions
for legislations that are useful under general regulatory conditions. In relation to
shareholders’ voting power, this article proposes to improve understanding of the
complexity of remuneration reports. Shareholders should have a meeting before
they vote on executive remuneration issues, to improve their understanding of the
complexity of the remuneration report.
In order to prevent pay for
underperformance among executive directors, shareholders should have a binding
vote on the implementation pay reports of executives who are going to leave the
company. In relation to board accountability, suggestions have been made that
236. 26 JUN. 2012, Parl Deb HC (2012) col. 41; 04 SEPT. 2013, Parl Deb HC (2013) col. 105
(UK) (Proposals suggesting having employee representatives in remuneration committee have been
declined twice in the UK.).
237. Association of Chartered Certificated Accountants Report 2015, Shareholder Primacy in UK
Corporate Law: An exploration of the rationale and evidence, 41, http://www.accaglobal.com/us/en/
technical-activities/technical-resources-search/2011/september/rationale-and-evidence.html [perma.cc/
N5CM-EANQ].
238. Edward Cadman, Earnings Grow at Fastest Rate for Six Years, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2015.
239. Editorial, UK’s Enviably Smooth Economic Recovery, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2015, at
Opinion.
240. Attracta Mooney, “Get Rich Quick” Executive Pay Deals under Threat, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2018.
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facilitate better communication with shareholders. A concision requirement should
be imposed on remuneration reporting content and structure, perhaps via the
corporate governance code. In order to promote the independence of board
members and their negotiation with executive directors on executive remuneration,
legislation should be introduced to impose liabilities upon members who do not
fulfil their duty of care. From the perspective of pay for performance, companies’
long-term interests may be promoted through executive remuneration structure
adjustment. Regulations should encourage companies to increase the executives’
shareholding period after these shares have been exercised, and companies should
disclose the economic cost of issuing restricted share options to executive
directors. These proposals cannot guarantee that executive compensation levels
will be reduced, but they may make remuneration practices, such as shareholder
engagement in reports and remuneration committee accountability, more efficient.
Shareholders’ engagement in shareholding meetings and their passivity in
relation to corporate governance are still huge concerns. However, with the
globalization of the shareholder say on pay as a corporate governance measure to
align pay with performance, evidence has shown that there is a trend towards
participating in pay resolutions among international mutual funds, pension funds,
hedge funds, and individual investors.241 Although providing shareholders with a
say on pay does not necessarily lead to pay for performance and promote the
company’s long-term success, with more investors who are knowledgeable about
and willing to engage in remuneration practice, shareholders’ intervention may
develop in a positive direction.
Additionally, from the point of view of executive directors’ incentives, several
metrics have been designed to award managers for their leadership, community
skills, and teamwork, as long as these performances result in effective
management. Financial performance measures are usually calculated on a
quantitative basis, but these non-financial performance criteria are qualitative.242
The standards for paying managers for their non-financial performance may be
quite subjective compared to financial incentive schemes. Current concerns about
the relationship between remuneration committees and executive managers will
make it even harder for legislation to provide appropriate methods to pay directors
for their efforts, ethics, and reputations.
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